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I. NEWS FROM OLYMPUS 
IT is a fact of which the laity may take public notice that the United 
States Supreme Court has e.. .... "Perienced a revolution.1 Evidence of an 
unstable period abounds- forms loose their hold, jurists are released 
from conformity to rigid behavior patterns, a radical2 probing goes 
through matters-taken-for-granted to the roots of things. The group 
who deplored the Old Court, dominated by the Four Horsemen3 plus 
Hughes and/or Roberts, view the result with a satisfaction that calls for 
little support in analysis.4 The group to whom once the Supreme Court 
could do no wrong, are shocked by a bench of new men betraying the 
vested interests which it is their very office to conserve.li In contemplation 
t Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
tt Third Year Class, Yale Law School. 
1. The literature on the revolution is legion. For a cross-section sec Barnett, Ccm-
stitutioual Interpretatiot~ aud !lldicial Self-Restraint (1940) 39 ~hcu. L. RE\•. 213; 
Davis, Revolution in tlze Supreme Court (1940) 166 ATL. ~IONTHL\" S5; Hankin, Rc.:cnl 
Trends in the Decisions of the Supreme Court of tlze United States ll!MO) 8 Gm. WASH. 
L. REv. Hl01; Powell, Changing Constitutional Phases (1939) 19 B. U. L. REv. 5G9; 
Jackson, Back to tlze Constitutiou (1939) 25 A. B. A. J. 745 (all fa\·orable); Ballan-
tine, Business Without Precedents (1940) 166 ATL. MoNTHLY 235; Hogan, JmpiJrtar.t 
Shifts i1~ Constitutional Doctrines (1939) 25 A. B. A. J. 629; Johnston, Rcstt!ts of tl:c 
Supreme Court's Reversal of Constitlltional Theory (1939) 51 VA. B. A. Rl;:p, 265 (all 
critical). For a complete survey of the recent work of the Court see !lloore and Adelson, 
The Supreme Court: 1938 Term (1939-40) 26 VA. L. REv. 1, 697, SS7; ~{oore and Saks, 
The Supreme Court: 1939 Term-/. P11blic Law (1941) 27 VA. L. RE\•. 253. 
2. Radical, a good old word of the most respectable lineage, means one who per-
sists in getting to the root of the matter. Jeremy Bentham called himseli a radical; John 
Stuart Mill would not have taken offense at the term; in England the word today still car-
ries more than a vestige of its old meaning. It is an engaging gloss on the trend oi 
American thought that so necessary a word has gone so far astray. 
3. Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, Butler, JJ., of course. 
4. See Barnet, Davis, Hankin, Powell, and Jackson, s11pra note 1. 
5. See Hogan and Johnston, sttPra note 1. 
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of gross result, the nature of the institution, the technology by which it 
carries on, and its changing discretion in the pattern of public conti'Ol 
are likely to be overlooked. 
If the work of less than four "October terms" amounted to writing 
a "yes" for a "no" in an application of established formulas of Consti-
tutional law, the subject would invite no more than a catalogue of hold-
ings. But change- with its long arm, its disturbing touch, its decree 
of events not yet m_anifest- has come to all the folkways of appellate 
process. Legal issues have been stated in novel ways; concepts dominant 
have exchanged places with concepts recessive; a new relationship has 
been given to the question of substance and the legal mould in which it 
is cast. Hardly an aspect of the Court's work has been untouched; and 
since its own suits do symbolic duty for a multitude of their kind, the 
revolution has extended to the whole institution of federal litigation 
and to all the affairs- personal, corporate, public- which it embraces 
within its sweep. 
It is only rarely that the Court is permitted to write so significant 
a chapter in social history. On two previous occasions a shift of base, 
almost as sudden and brimful of consequences, has occurred. In the 
fourth decade of the last century, against the inherited theme of Mar-
shall's nationalism, the Court wrote as accompaniment the popular 
sovereignty of Jackson and Van Buren.6 A quarter of a century later, 
the Court was revitalized with another infusion of a national, Lincoln, 
republicanism. 7 A third revolution, startling in its results but emerging 
so gradually as to conceal its violence, attended the emergence of the 
national economy. Its rumblings began in the seventies ;8 the doors of 
the Court were blazed open for appropriate actions in the eighties ;9 and 
from the nineties to the twenties of our own century, the immunity of 
business enterprise to legislative control10 was renewed and broadenec1.11 
6. See generally CoRWIN, THE CoMMERCE PowER VERSUS STATES RIGHTS (1936) 
124ff.; cf. FRANKFURTER, THE Co:\IMERCE CLAUSE (1937) 47-73. 
7. See generally FAIRMAN, l!R. JusTICE MILLER AND THE SUI'REliiE CoURT (1939); 
SwiSHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAw (1930). 
8. See the dissents in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 83 (U. S. 1873) ; 
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 140-45 (1877). 
9. See among other cases Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886); Chicago, 
:M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 (1890) ; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 
578 (1897). See generally Haines, Judicial Revic·w of Lcgislatio11 i1~ the Uuilcd States 
( 1924) 3 TEx. L. REv. 1. 
10. In the Constitution "the due process" was only the most prominent among the 
clauses which bowed before the surging winds of opinion. Commerce among the sev-
eral states and the power to tax came to be regularly employed; the law of patents came 
to reflect impinging doctrine; and even the spending power did not completely escape 
invasion. 
11. In law the dominant doctrine was liberty of contract; in economics it was known 
as free enterprise; in political science, as laissez-faire; in philosophy, as individualism. 
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But that there have been others does not make the recent upheaval 
less of a revolution for us. They now belong to the past, and such 
vitality as they once possessed lies now in that shadow land called 
history. In respect to upheavals which are gone, the returns are all in; 
in the instant case, the forces of change have not yet come to rest and 
we can sense only dimly its incidence upon a turbulent and emergent 
commonwealth. Here, as never before, there was fanfare off stage and 
a peal of lusty trumpets as prologue to the usual drama. The state of 
the nation made some sort of Court Unpacking plan inevitable. The 
national economy, despite little crochet patches of reform, had come 
turbulently into being under private- tl1at is largely corporate- aus-
pices. It had, following the Great \Var, gone through a period of 
feverish activity which collapsed into the Great Depression. An attempt 
to get the industrial machine going by pouring in money at the top had 
led the Hoover administration to defeat attended by tl1e collapse of the 
banking structure. As the Roosevelt regime took over, the need was 
for a drastic program of action. It may well be that it lacked the 
knowledge and understanding demanded by a national crisis. Certainly 
learning was too much in bondage to the system which had broken down 
to point a clear path, and public policy had to feel its way with measures 
which could he little more than e.x-periments. But, as the New Deal 
was challenged in a series of cases, the Court was in no position to set 
even amateurs right. The legalisms which its majority brought to judg-
ment were more irrelevant to the problems which had to be met than 
the Acts of Congress which tl1ey struck down. Their arguments-at-law 
were impressed with economic norms and political theories already out-
worn; and the realities whence emerges the general welfare lay far beyond 
the remote orbits in which their minds revolved. 
Thus men of good will, with archaic doctrine, accentuated the crisis 
of the commonwealth. A head-strong group, firm in its own doginatism, 
forced its mandates upon the more sensitive members of its own group, 
upon realistic judges who sit upon lower federal benches, upon the ad-
ministrative and legislative arms of the government. Its stress was laid 
upon the independence of the judiciary, and its arbitrary will was clothed 
in the rhetoric of a mere mechanical- and wholly discretionless- appli-
cation of the law to cases or controversies as they came along. The Court's 
philosophy, as fixed by a slightly shifting majority, had little place for 
giving conscious direction to an economy which, like it or not, was on 
the move. It indulged freedom to the things to come only if their shape 
accorded with moulds already decreed by the Court. The affairs of man-
kind might go astray; the Court possessed the absolute to which they 
were bound to return. 
Few there were who defended the wisdom of the Court's decisions; 
but many proclaimed the sacredness of its right to do the unsound thing. 
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To them the way out of the dilemma was to let nature take its course; 
in the fullness of time the lines of the great charter would be straightened 
out by the demise of judges. The bolder of the group, however, would 
prod nature along; it would separate official tenure from physical life; 
and, since justices are to hold their offices during "good behavior," it 
would with undiminished compensation induce their retirement. Another 
group, conscious that exit could not be unduly hastened, set about finding 
a stimulus to entrance, and elaborated the President's Court Plan. It 
set forth a way of gaining new blood, even if old blood refused to go 
on its way.12 
The fortunes of the bill are well known; that abortive chapter in legis-
lative history does not have to be retold here.13 But the attending cir-
cumstance needs to be recalled; for out of it emerged a general climate 
of opinion receptive to a new personnel reforming the honored bench 
to which they ascended. If the Senate failed to coerce, it made it abund-
antly clear what it did not like; and, if there was no statute to restrain, 
proprieties were proclaimed which set limits of tolerance to judicial 
discretion. Reformation was expected from the Court itself and it was 
well advised to do through a self-denying ordinance what an Act of 
Congress did not command. An institution had been saved, but the 
escape was by a narrow margin; an ominous go-and-sin-no-more was 
the price of salvation. 
In the atmosphere of this challenge the new appointees ascended the 
high bench. Qualified as severally they were for the duties ahead, each 
came to his office as a layman. Each had occupied some vantage post 
from which the easy or grudging response of high legal process to 
the strains of a developing culture were to be observed. Each, through 
concrete experience, could testify to the mischief which had been done 
by an attempt of the Court to impose its rigid dogma upon the seething 
activities of society. Black, as Senator and Chairman of the Committee 
on Labor, had witnessed the rise of the working man as an interest in 
the commonwealth. He had seen an inchoate mass of men b~come articu-
late, discover that they counted, assert their rights in the face of an 
unsympathetic judiciary. Reed, as Solicitor General, had taken Acts of 
Congress as stumbling answers to insistent necessities, reduced legislative 
remedies to causes at law, and had seen the Court employ a hocus-pocus 
guided by personal preference to block the path of social experimenta-
tion. Frankfurter had for thirty years made the Supreme Court his 
critical study; and, in passing its work in critical review, had evolved 
his own norms for its process and performance. Douglas, after a far 
from academic concern with business units, bankruptcy, protection of 
12. For the many proposals see Heariugs before the Committe£' of the J11diriary 011 
S. 1392, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); SEN. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Scss. (1937). 
13. The story is told in ALSOP AND CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS (1938). 
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the investor, had taken a dominant part in getting an agency of 
financial control under way and in developing techniques of administra-
tion. Murphy, as an e.xecutive, had been called upon to meet crises, and 
under dramatic circumstances had e.'\.-perienced thl! need for insistent 
action uncomplicated by the paralyzing resort to litigation. Alike the 
new appointees came from a world of affairs; alike they saw the judiciary 
as one among many agencies of public control; alike they had become 
sensitive to the confusion which came about when judges overstepped 
their competence and the Court ventured outside its proper domain.H 
Thus promptings from within reinforced urges from without to demand 
re-examination by the Court of its office and the manner of its perform-
ance. But fruits of that re-e.xamination could not stand forth at once. 
A craft fixes its way of work, and the Court has its traditions to which 
all men trained in the law, however radical or consen·ative, will accord 
respect. Articles of faith are not recited; reference to them is piecemeal 
as the argument of the instant case demands. In granting or denying 
certiorari, in attention to items of appeal and error, in breadth or narrow-
ness of the statement of facts, in selecting from inquisitorial candidates 
the question at issue, in the strategic use of precedents, in decreeing the 
next steps in the development of a doctrine, in the verbal choices which 
define holdings, in the subtlety of overtone whiclt adds to or subtracts 
from the formal utterance, the Court decrees its own power, speeds or 
stays process, gives contours to the law. From these meager details the 
larger picture must be constructed. 
The best evidence of a change in attitude is that the Court has receded 
from the front pages. It no longer claims the spotlight by decisive judi-
cial battles, the event of each of which is to veto some commitment in 
national policy. It no longer assumes an oracular monopoly of the Con-
stitution; the United States Reports are duller reading than once they 
were. Further testimony to a revolution is presented by current reactions 
to the work of the Court. The shift of office and direction of doctrine 
were plainly visible to a President of the American Bar Association 
when he declared that, because of the Court's oblh·ion to the American 
tradition, "legislative independence and legislative wisdom are .America's 
almost sole reliance for the continuation of that security of the blessings 
of liberty for which the Constitution was framed." 1G Others decry the 
overthrow of the past.16 But these novel departures are not refusals to 
14. The ground-work laid by the famous dissenting judges-Holmes, Brnndcis, Stone, 
Cardozo, and occasionally Hughes-must not be forgotten. 
15. See Hogan, supra note 1, at 638. 
16. See Ballantine, supra note 1. Note also Johnston, supra note 1, at 292: "The 
American constitutional system is taking water under no inherent weakness o£ its 
structure. . . . It is bogging down as a result of whimsies, debts, bureaus and functions 
let in through bilge cocks opened by a majority of the Justices sitting upon a rcc<.n-
structed court contrary to the mandate during six gcnerativns of more than a hundred 
[sic] of their predecessors." 
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follow precedents. They lie upon quite another plane from that upon 
which stare decisis operates; for they represent an application of the 
current bench's theory of the Court's orbit to cases as they come along, 
and agreement or disagreement with past performance is a secondary 
phenomenon. 
If the Court has accepted a new philosophy, the reverberations may 
be deafening. The prevailing outlook of the bench, in respect to the 
economy and the commonwealth, speaks through the intricate technology 
by which the Court's business is done. A shift in attitude here decrees 
a myriad dominant and echoing responses in the detail of decision. Let 
the bench commit itself to laissez-faire: the statute is confronted by a 
challenge; the administrative ruling is in jeopardy; the party who objects 
is allowed to cry out before he is hurt; the lower courts hamstring the 
operations of government with vetoes and immunitiesP Let it put on 
another philosophy- or affect so far as it is able that "the Constitution 
of the United States" does not embody a political economic theory- and 
the whole pattern of political discretion makes its response. 
But the new philosophy is not found by analysis of the detail of judg-
ment after judgment; perspective lies not in categories of doctrines. The 
search is for the model of winepress which produces new wine to be 
poured into old bottles. The story lies in the Court's redefinition of its 
own function and a re-drawing of the lines which mark out its self-
appointed jurisdiction. Nor need the story stop there. If now is the 
time for re-examination of function, bold steps may be taken. Though 
the Court tread cautiously, the observer may strike forth to explore the 
entire area. 
II. OFFICE oF THE CouRT 
The current bench has become acutely sensitive to the question of 
office and limits of competence. Any definition of domain and boundaries 
must emerge from the nature of the issues which may be brought before 
the Court. It is at once a judicial and a political body. It is judicial in 
that its usages are of a court of law. It considers cases between adverse 
parties; follows the etiquette of legal process ; affirms, revises, annuls 
judgments addressed to particular persons. It is political in that its orders 
extend far beyond the individuals immediately involved; it fixes concti-
tions and sets bounds about the resort to law; it revises the pattern 
of the separation of powers among agencies of government; it endows 
with intent, discovers latent meaning and resolves conflicts between legis-
lative acts ; it invokes Constitution, statute, its own decisions to hold 
Congress, department, administrative body in its place. Even when it 
17. See especially JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JuDICIAL SuPREMACY (1941) 115-23. 
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imposes self-denial upon itself, politically it extends the frontiers of 
some other agency of control. 
JudgmentS along these lines are political, not legal, decisions. Issues 
of due process, equal protection, privileges and immunities, are questions 
of the limits of the province of government. Issues of federal supremacy, 
commerce among the several states, immunity for government instru-
mentality are questions of the balance of powers within the federal system. 
Issues of separation and delegation of power are questions of the dis-
tribution of the tasks of Government among the agencies through which 
it operates. And beneath the formal terms in which all such questions 
are put, lie conflicts which involve the status and prospects of groups 
within the economy. A business unit pleads national supremacy as an 
escape from local ta..xes; an industry in the cause of its own balance-
sheet becomes solicitous of states' rights.18 Vested interest collides with 
vested interest within the solemnities of due process of law; the spirit 
of acquisition seeks to convert the inalienable rights of man into an 
immunity for corporate personality. On one leYel issues concern legal 
equities; upon a second, the division of political power; upon a third, 
the clash between the interests which make up the commonwealth. 
However justices may put the questions, they cannot frame their 
judgments so that incidence lies upon the single leYel of legal equities. 
Questions of law present symbols through which political issues are 
resolved; and the political terms do vicarious duty for economic interests. 
Jurists are quite aware of the realities which appear before them dis-
guised as legal disputants; and few of their number ars: content to compel 
the-difference-which-it-makes to wait upon the sidelines until the verbal 
ordeal has reached its result. It is only the simple soul oblivious to his 
judicial office who measures a human act by the plain words of a statute, 
appraises a course of conduct by the abstract dicta of former decisions, 
or lays the article of the Constitution beside the statute to see if they 
square. ·whatever lip service is accorded the abacadabra, the judge strives 
for an appreciation of all that is involYed, takes a surreptitious look at the 
political forces, or uses personal values as an animating spark. The \\;ser 
jurists are well aware of the polydimensional unh·erse in which they 
work; the ones who profess devotion to a juristic process untainted by 
alien considerations are usually unaware of the sources of their own 
preferences. However its opinions are dressed for appearance in public, 
the Court either decides with an eye to consequences or chooses bet,.veen 
doctrines proffered by rival attorneys, whose briefs e.xhibit a pragmatic 
architecture, and whose use of doctrine is dictated by non-legal interests. 
18. "When men begin to talk about the danger of infringing the rights of sel£-g;;w-
ernment, they usually mean that they fear for the special interests of the sections they 
represent They seldom go forth to do political battle for the sake of abstract political 
theories." 1fAcDoNALD, FEDERAL Am (1923) 239. 
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Questions of constitutional law, statutory meaning, the reach of an 
administrative order present differences in scale; but, in their several 
degrees, they invite the same movement of mind on many planes to 
a single conclusion. A federal imposition of a price-structure for bitu-
minous coal turns upon English usage in respect to "commerce" in the 
late eighteenth century ;19 the chancellor's injunction against interference 
with a yellow-dog contract rests upon a notion that union officials are 
uninterested parties, whose legal status as "strangers" may be traced 
back to the year books.20 The control which the patentee may impose 
upon the retail prices of his licensee's goods is deduced from a liberty 
of contract which sprang into legal being in a domain remote from 
trade practice. 21 Yet the one presents the issue of an orderly or a chaotic 
industry; the second, of the validity of collective bargaining as an instru-
ment of trade unionism; the third, of a sanction of the Government as 
a defense against the competition demanded by the law of the land. 
In such matters as these the judge can find a traditional doctrine relevant 
only by closing his eyes to all that is going on about him. 
But, however obvious may be the issues of political power and 
economic interest, the question is put to the Court in legal terms. Its 
process of decision is likewise circumscribed; and its answer is no more 
than the resolution of an issue between parties to the suit. Its heritage 
makes the judicial process in many respects an antithesis to that of the 
legislature. In form its issue is justice between contending persons; 
the business of the legislature is with rules under which all who are 
concerned may carry on. The court refers to legal norms, a course of 
conduct set forth in a record; the legislature predicates judgment upon 
all that can be gathered about the matter at issue. Judicial tradition sug-
gests narrows bounds of art- no move without a genuine case or 
controversy, fact as served through strict rules of evidence, judicial 
notice only of that not to be disputed, taboo upon intangible and at-
mosphere, irrelevance of all that goes beyond the immediate issue. The 
legislature, entertaining an issue of policy, plays down the personal and 
roams at its will for all that will impart meaning. Against the wide 
sweep of the legislative process, in which all parties in interest may be 
heard, and even hopes and hazards of the future may be given place, 
the Court's task is performed within the strictures of due process. A 
case is docketed, the Court agrees to listen to an appeal, the parties are 
represented by attorneys, counsel have at each other with oral argument 
and printed brief; the bench takes the suit under advisement and renders 
a judgment in favor of one side. The reach of the order, the inter-
19. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936). See HAliiiLToN AND ADAIR, 
THE PowER TO GoVERN (1937). 
20. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1917). 
21. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U. S. 175 (1938). 
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pretation of the statute, the command of the Constitution, the fixing 
of the line between authorities, the recognition or denial of an economic 
interest emerge only within the interstices of the opinion or as proposi-
tions essential to the announced result. In disposing of the case the 
Court does not have to make e.."-plicit the rule of Jaw which is compelling. 
Though the real interest of the public is in the criteria of conduct, 
declaration of the law is a by-product of the affirmance or reversal of 
judgments from below. Thus broad political process goes forward under 
forms evolved for the disposition of a narrow cause of action. 
As creatures of the social order, judges cannot become oblivious to 
the political questions they are called upon to answer. Yet, as members 
of a craft, they are conscious of legal issues, operate in a legal atmos-
phere, respond to legal compulsions. The result is a hybrid process of 
mind in which far more goes on than can be contained in the form of 
opinion. Fact, value, background, projection into the future come into 
play, although their presence cannot be admitted. The scope of inquiry 
is broader than is affected, yet narrower than a direct attack upon the 
real issue would command. The judge must prod deeper and range 
further afield than he can usually admit; yet be is denied the facilities 
and enjoined from the act of inquiring into all that needs to be known 
to resolve the larger question. Rarely can the Court meet the real issue 
directly; it can always becloud the argument which marches to judgment 
so that only the initiate can read the implications. It can, while professing 
concern, avoid action; it can, while assuming to avoid it, assert political 
power. ·where its larger commands are written in the detail of holdings, 
its results may escape public scrutiny. Its work, thus belonging to h..-o 
worlds, does not easily invite appraisal and provides no ob,·ious check 
upon irresponsibility. 
In private law, the Court's work is in no vital way affected with a 
public interest. There its concern is with traditional subjects; it handles 
only a trickle of a mighty stream which pours through the lower courts;~ 
its chance intrusion does little more than give prestige to one among 
competing rules or note a trend in public to which private law might 
well conform.23 \Vhere its oversight has manifest importance, the matter 
in spite of form really belongs to public law. In patents, for e..'ample, 
the suit is a private battle behveen individuals, yet the Court's real 
concern is with the limits of a private claim within the public domain 
of the useful arts.24 Aside from these rare cases which impinge on a 
22. See FRANKFURTER AND LA:t-.'DIS, THE BusiNESs OF THE SUP!!E!JE CoURT (1927) 
307-18. 
23. And since Erie R R v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 6-1 (1938), there has been little 
occasion to do more than warn lower courts to bow to the commands of state judges. 
24. See HAMILTON, PATENTS .\ND FREE ENTf:Rl'RISE (TXEC ~{onogra.ph Xo. 31, 
1941) pp. 129-34. 
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public policy of importance to other agencies of government, the Court 
stands supreme in supervising private litigation and its power is un-
questioned. 
But the bulk of the Court's work is concerned with matters which lie 
within the expanding zone in which government meets the person, natural 
or corporate. Its task is to resolve all disputes which grow out of the 
accommodation of the activities of a people to the norms of public policy. 
It passes in review cases concerned with obedience or disobedience to 
the orders of the President and the Executive departments, the Acts 
of Congress, the commands of the various agencies to which the over-
sight of the economy has been delegated. In such matters its decisions 
recognize or deny legal standil'lg to officials, enlarge or narrow their 
authorities, specify the sanctions upon which they may rely. In like 
manner it decrees the domains within, and the devices by, which the 
several states may impose their lesser policies. Thus the Court is forever 
engaged in a process of fixing the lines by which the activities of persons 
are kept in accord with the general welfare. In the running sum of its 
choices a pattern of benefit and deprivation is written; and wherever its 
incidence falls, there in effect it has taken sides. It must, with acumen 
and wariness, steer its constant course through matters that are con-
troversial; yet it must avoid all appearance of being itself engaged in 
controversy. Its prestige depends upon recourse to ultimates which lie 
far above the petty interests which clash in court. 
From the first the Court has found it expedient to veil its exercise 
of power.25 It is far easier to plead that there has been no discretion 
than to justify its act of choice. It-is-not-we-who-speak, once established, 
comes to be taken for granted and makes secure the institution. An 
overt exercise of power, however wise, has always to be defended in the 
instant and leaves the Court constantly exposed. Given its task, its 
concern with political problems in legal form, its need to mask an in-
escapable discretion, some controlling authority was inevitable. It had 
to be a something than which there was nothing more ultimate; yet 
a something whose sanctions were so abstract and whose language was 
so general as not to rob the bench of its power of choice. The written 
Constitution, whether or not designed for dialectical use by the judiciary, 
was at the least a handy instrument for the purpose. Even if its primary 
intent was to establish a structure of government and a great mass of 
the writing was meant for a more immediate political use, there was 
language in it which the Court could use as a reference. Although the 
available lines were few, exposition could easily compensate for any 
lack in quantity. In their absence, the Court eventually might have had 
recourse to an order of nature, the inalienable rights of man, an economy 
25. See Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 180 (U. S. 
1803) ("a law repugnant to the constitution is void; ... courts ... arc bound by 
that instrument."). 
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too obvious to be disputed.26 As it was, the Constitution merely provided 
the frame within which the higher commonsense was set and from 
time to time renewed. As with the higher, so too with the lesser law in 
its several degrees. Statute, ordinance, administrative ruling presented 
narrower ambits; but each, in its own degree, demanded sanction and 
invoked decision; each presented a kindred demand for a choicelcss 
discretion. 
Thus the Court had to deny, even as it was compelled to make, policy. 
Its avowed theory served not only to throw a screen about its own work 
but also to salve the collective conscience of the bench. In support of 
this it contrived various teclmiques out of the most reputable staff at 
hand. It was, under the rule of separation, at the head of one of three 
coordinate departments of government. It could not substitute its own 
for an Act of Congress; nor could it obtrude its will into any instru-
ment through which the delegate of Executh·e or Legislature acted. It 
was, accordingly, driven to a mechanistic view of its own judgment. 
"The judicial branch of the government has only one duty- to lay the 
article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is 
challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former." 21 
The Court's only power "is the power of judgment" 28 exercised in a 
manner "uninfluenced by predilection for or against the policy disclosed 
in the legislation." 29 The Court "neither approves nor condemns any 
legislative policy."30 If the Constitution "stands in the way of desirable 
legislation, the blame must rest upon that instrument, and not upon the 
court for enforcing it according to its terms." 31 A fundamental law, 
made "with the enlarged vision of those who are building for a future 
unknown or dimly discerned" might, through failure in foresight or in 
adequate endowment, betray it in a crisis or because of the "infinite 
variety of the changing conditions of our National Iife ... 32 The Great 
Charter might become the Great Scapegoat. 
Such a theory could not forever conceal the antithesis between appear-
ance and reality. As critical winds blew from without,33 doubts in the 
26. Compare the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Jones,., S. E. C., 293 U. S. 1, 32 
(1936) : "Appeal is vaguely made to some constitutioll31 immunity, whether c.-.."Press or 
implied is not stated with distinctness." An interesting treasure hunt can also be built 
around a search for the constitutional pro\'ision st3nding behind the decision in Crnn-
&11 v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (U. S. 1868). 
27. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 62 (1936). 
28. ld. at p. 63. 
29. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R., 295 U. S. 330, 346 (1935). 
30. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 63 (1936). 
31. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, .f04 (1937) (dissent). 
32. Mr. Justice Moody dissenting in the Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 
520-22 (1908). 
33. See particularly the pioneer statement by Powell, The Logic and Rlu:loric of 
Constitutional Law (1918) 15 J. OF PHIL. PsYcH. & ScL ~!ETH. 645. 
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faith appeared from within. Only the most unsophisticated jurists were 
at home with it; and it rode highest when feelings ran deepest and 
jurists dared not doubt that their own positions were closely adjacent 
to the eternal verities. But justices who suspected that even the highest 
of benches was not insulated against prevalent belief, were reluctant to 
parade the make-believe. Mr. Justice Holmes frequently attacked the 
theory as faulty constitutional law. "As the decisions now stand, I can 
hardly see any limit but the sky to the invalidating of [the rights of the 
states] if they happen to strike a majority of this Court as for any 
reason undesirable." 34 Again, "I cannot believe that the [Fourteenth] 
Amendment was intended to give us carte blanche to embody our economic 
or moral beliefs in its prohibition." 3u And Mr. Justice Stone allowed 
many strands of disbelief to converge into the classic lines of his dissent 
in the Triple-A case. In speaking of the parade of horribles by the 
majority he observed, "Such suppositions are addressed to the mind 
accustomed to believe that it is the business of courts to sit in judgment 
on the wisdom of legislative action. Courts are not the only agency 
of government that must be assumed to have capacity to govern." 80 
Such views, long recessive, have now become dominant.87 As they 
emerge they restate, rather than eliminate, the problem which provoked 
them into being. In a sense the change marks a long stride forward. 
It strikes at a dualism between word and deed, by which the Court 
could act yet deny the consequences of its own decision. It makes it 
impossible any longer for the majority of the bench to pretend not to 
do that in which they are busily engaged. And it means that the Court 
is inclined to accord full faith· and credit to other agencies of govern-
ment. Viewed in its most commendable light it amounts to a judicial 
attitude of respect for the ability of others to employ the words "good" 
and "right," "prefer" and "legal." But, as it passes from the idiom 
of protest to that of decision, a certain inchoate character stands forth. 
If it lives up to its declaration, the Court must scrupulously avoid all 
exercise of political powers; yet, under an intricate control where choices 
must be made between things in conflict which both profess to be legal, 
that is impossible. The intricacies of the federal system, of the ·national 
economy, of the emerging commonwealth utterly forbid it. Nor can 
the Court overtly assert the discretion which it actually exercises; for 
that would be to deny the absence of the taking of sides upon which 
the very judicial process itself rests. Viewed in its most unfavorable 
light, it represents a Machiavellian philosophy of going only so far 
as the Court can and still avoid the charge of 11judicial usurpation" 
34. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 595 (1930) (dissenting). 
35. Ibid. 
36. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 87 (1936). 
37. See notes 82, 98, 112 infra. 
HeinOnline  -- 50 Yale L. J. 1331 1940-1941
1941] SPECIAL COMPETENCE OF SUPREME COURT 1331 
hurled at the late unregenerated bench. The ultimate length to which 
such a profession can go is the sackcloth and ashes of self-restraint; 
at best it represents an unsatisfactory attempt to enunciate a doctrine 
of balance between the judicial and the avowedly policy-making agencies 
of state. Unsatisfactory, because it sets down no clear line of demarca-
tion of functions. An admonition to tread lightly, addressed to its own 
members, makes an ultimate out of a subjective quality in judgment. 
So long as men, even in their judicial office, are unlike, it will induce 
a widely variable response. At one end of the spectrum of decision 
stands a passing of 'the buck, at the other a can-1-get-away-with-it? 
But more important is the aloofness of self-denial. It stands as a 
profession of faith, abstract, general, vague; it lacks tl1e clear-cut con-
tour,38 the precision of statement, the detail of techniques by which it 
can be applied to tl1e kind of docket which the Court cannot escape. 
It was formulated in the days when statutes were subjected to the ordeal 
of the higher law and as often as not failed to meet tl1e test. Its origin, 
as it passes from dissent to dominance, makes it a doctrine of consti-
tutional interpretation. In a large part of tl1is domain, a laissez-faire 
attitude is quite feasible. Acts of Congress and of the legislatures of 
the several states are almost never to be called null and void.::m But 
"the great tradition" has not allowed even tl1e present bench to deny 
a domain of freedom reserved to the individual into which e\·en govern-
ment itself must not intrude; and when state clashes witl1 federal 
autl1ority, the Court cannot completely escape marking out boundaries. 
J\Iore important, the host of cases in which a constitutional issue does 
not appear- or can be avoided- is left to the bench. The Court may 
admit that Congress had full power to decree all that was claimed for 
the Act, yet insist that "the plain words" of its statute fall short or 
deny that its intent was to go so far.40 It may, in a hundred ways, gross 
or subtle, set down an ultra vires between official act and legislative 
sanction. Such questions must be decided ; they make up the great bulk 
of the docket; and to their resolution a rationale must be brought. The 
withdra\val from the constitutional field seems to be a change not in 
characteF but in magnitude. A formal concern with political power no 
longer appears on a cosmic scale; its trends are to be spelled out from 
the minutiae which make up many lines of day to day decision. The 
very detail may make results less abiding; the lower plane on which 
work is done may give greater play to legalisms. The threat of a some-
38. As recently as April 28, 1941, Mr. Justice Douglas recited the faith· "We are 
not concerned, however, with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation." 
Olsen v. Nebraska, 61 Sup. Ct. 862, 865 (U. S. 1941). Does tltis serve as a clear-cut 
rule of permissible action? 
39. See notes 93, 98 infra for e.xamples of hedging by the Court. 
40. See pp. 1357-67 infra. 
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what greater confusion may hang over the pattern in the making. Yet 
inevitable power politics and the control of the economy are still present. 
The Court cannot be unaware that a change in scale is not an escape 
from a definition of office. The Reports give ample evidence of a 
striving, by individuals and as a collect, for a philosophy of discretion 
to replace that which is goneY Although its statement is over-general, 
and as yet its validity has not been attested by the variety of situation 
it is called upon to resolve, its outline has already emerged. Its attempt 
is to work out an accord between the traditional function of the Court 
and the necessities of a modern, industrial state. Fbr its roots the doc-
trine goes back to the separation of powers; for its relevancy, it accords 
recognition to the hierarchy of authorities through which individuals 
in society supervise activities of mutual concern. Its key-word is "com-
petence." Each agency of state- executive, legislature, commission, 
board, lower court- is to be accorded authority within the demesne 
of its own competence. And, as one among agencies by which the will 
of the people is impressed upon its multifarious business, the Supreme 
Court itself must stay within the frontiers which mark out its special 
competence. 
In more specific terms, this Court - and all others - will act only 
when it is competent; and, when resort is properly had to it, will act 
only in the manner in which it is competent. A thread of doctrine from 
long ago becomes a dominant strand. From the days of Luther v. 
Borden/2 the Court has possessed a ready way of escape; it has had 
only to cry "political question" to allow the issue to go to some other 
body. In more recent times, certain fields in which the entry of the 
judiciary might disturb yet could hardly clear up, have been recognized 
as beyond its province. The treaty-making power was some time ago 
admitted to be almost, if not quite, out of its reach ;43 and recently it 
has been loath to interfere in the maintenance of labor standards on 
Government contracts.44 The doctrine derives, too, from the long list 
41. See pp. 1344-49; 1370-72 infra. 
42. 7 How. 1 (U. S. 1849). 
43. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936); Z. & 
F. ,Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull, 311 U. S. 470, 490 (1941) (concurring opinion 
by Black and Douglas, ]].). 
44. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940). The technical legal argument 
of Mr. Justice Black was that the plaintiff had no standing to sue because it had suffered 
no legal injury. This represents, of course, legal reasoning at its worst because the cri· 
terion of legal injury is whether a court will redress the injury-i.e., whether there is 
standing to sue. The Justice retrieved himself, however, by setting out the real reason 
for the decision. "The case before us makes it fitting to remember that 'The interfer· 
ence of the Courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the Government, would 
be productive of nothing but mischief; ... '" !d. at 131, quoting from Decatur v. Pauld-
ing, 14 Pet. 497, 516 (U. S. 1840). Cf. United States v. Bush, 310 U. S. 371 (1940). 
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of dissents which plead for judicial restraint. The Court must not 
set aside the legislative act ;4:; it was not formally charged to do some-
thing ;46 it lacked the facilities, the h.-now ledge, the understanding ;41 it 
was not competent to prescribe, or even to declare that the remedy chosen 
was not a reasonable one.48 The great impulse towards such a doctrine, 
however, has come from the rapid growth of administrati\'e control. 
"On the basis of intrinsic sh.;Us and equipment . . . the federal courts 
[are not] qualified to set their independent judgment on such matters 
against that of the chosen state authorities. Presumably that body [a 
state commission] . . . possesses an insight and aptitude which can 
hardly be matched by judges who are called upon to inten•ene at fitful 
intervals."49 Such an attitude is especially apparent where the legisla-
ture in specific terms has stated where competence lies. "Congress 
entrusted the Board, not the courts, with the power to draw inferences 
from the facts." "The Board, like other e.'\.-pert agencies dealing with 
specialized fields . . . has the function of appraising conflicting and 
circumstantial evidence, and the weight and credibility of testimony.":;o 
The language varies, but the trend is clear. The Court does not intend 
to substitute its judgment for that of the agency whose work it passes 
in review. An ultimate authority is not to replace the appropriate com-
petence. 
Items such as these are only glimmerings of a philosophy of com-
petence. Here an injunction against the judiciary usurping an adminis-
trative office ;:;1 there a warning against a remote control of a local 
matter. 52 Here an insistence that the judicial process must not be pushed 
45. See the quotations, p. 1330 srtpra. 
46. Compare :Mr. Justice Brandeis dissenting in Railroad Comm. o£ Calif. v. Los 
Angeles Ry., 280 U. S. 145, 164-66 (1929) ; Beat v. Missouri P. R. R., 312 U. S. 45 
(1941); cases cited infra note 52. 
47. See :Mr. Justice Brandeis concurring in St. Joseph Stod."}':lrds Co. v. United 
States, 298 U. S. 38, 86-93 (1936) ; cf. his dissent in Burns Baking Co. ''· Br}':ln, 254 
u. s. 504, 517 (1924). 
48. See, for example, the dissents in Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsyh':lnia, ZJ7 U. S. 
389, 403 (1928); Ribnik v. :McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 359 (197..8) ; Tyson & Bro. v. Ban-
ton, 273 U. S. 418, 445, 447 (1927). 
49. Railroad Comm. of Te..'\.-as v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U. S. 570, 575 
(1941). 
50. N. L. R. B. v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U. S. 584, 597 (19-U). 
51. See Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126 (1941); N. L. R. B. v. 
Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 310 U. S. 318 (1940) ; N. L. R. B. v. Watemtan S. S. Co., 
309 U. S. 206 (1940) ; N. L. R. B. v. Falk Corp., 308 U. S. 453 (1940) ; N. L. R. B. , .. 
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U. S. 241 (1939); cf. F. C. C. v. 
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134 (1940). 
52. See Railroad Comm. of Texas v. Pullman Co., 61 Sup. Ct. 643 (U. S. 1941) ; 
Palmer v. :Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79 (1939) ; cf. Nash\'ille, C. & St. L. Ry. Y. Brown-
. ing, 310 U. S. 362 (1940). 
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beyond its proper domain ;53 there a protest at judges having a fling 
with crafts which are not their own.64 No full-blown theory of com-
petence is presented; if it has been formulated, it can hardly be expressed 
within the traditional limits of judicial opinion. Even more, there is 
question whether the current bench is ready to accept the necessary 
consequences of its adoption of novel norms. Older members of the 
Court have already voiced a dissenting fear that the old days of policy-
making are returning.m; In any event, if competence comes to be the 
rule, the rule is the Court's rule; and the Court, by proclaiming or deny-
ing competence, divides authority among the various agencies of govern-
ment. A rejection of power is a change in the manner of its assertion. 
III. THE CRITERIA OF COMPETENCE 
It is not easy to discover the criteria of competence. No absolute is 
to be invoked; for domains do not stand out sharply, and the techniques 
of control merge into each other. It is idle to insist that jurisdiction 
runs with crafts, when crafts bear confused marks of identity. It is 
experience with a subject rather than skills brought into play which 
causes one board to differ from another. A commission, however con-
cerned with the facts, cannot ignore the law; a court, however intent 
upon the rule, cannot ignore the situation before it. Competence is an 
affair of elements and of degree; the factors which make it up may be 
variously compounded; the variation from proficiency to proficiency is 
a matter of more or less. There are many things which a court can 
do well, yet not so well as some other body. There are many things, 
which at the current state of public policy, no agency can handle quite 
adequately; yet one agency promises a little better result than another. 
In one realm a court may boldly enter, where in another it must go 
warily. As a relative term competence raises a series of specific questions. 
Who, then, is to decide competence and appoint bounds? In the first 
instance power lies with the legislature. The jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court lies with Congress ;56 the pattern for "the inferior courts, is of 
Congressional making. From time to time, in various provinces, Congress 
has enlarged or narrowed the Court's domain and has changed the man-
ner in which its authority is exercised. 57 As aspects of a rising national 
-
53. See M:r. Justice Black dissenting in McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U. S, 
419, 423 (1938); M:r. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. State 
Bd. of Tax Appeals, 307 U. S. 313 (1939). 
54. See Railroad Comm. of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U. S. 570 
(1941); Railroad Comm. of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573 (1940). 
55. See the quotations of Mr. Justice Stone, p. 1367 iufra, and Mr. Justice Roberts, 
note 194 i1~fra. · 
56. Except in so far as Article III of the Constitution confers jurisdiction without 
Congressional action. C f. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 ( 1932). 
57. See FRANKFURTER AND LANDis, THE BusiNEss OF THE SuPREME CouRT (1927), 
especially c. 7. 
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economy demanded oversight, the legislature, national and state, created 
agencies of administrative control. It has moved because the volume 
of traffic had become greater than the judiciary could handle; but its 
form of answer had been impelled by an attempt to discover a more 
appropriate procedure than resort to Iitigation.lls The going at times 
has been difficult and courts have been jealous of other bodies which 
have encroached upon their preserves. till 
A dilemma results; the lines of authority move in opposite directions. 
The legislature marks out the province within which the Court is com-
petent; the Court decrees the legislative intent and tells the law-making 
body what it means by its own statute. co In the administrative body 
Congress acts by deputy; the lines which block off administrative com-
petence are fixed by the Court.61 If the legislature asserts that it has 
the final say, the judicial branch acts under its overlord and loses its 
independence. If the last word remains with the Court, the judiciary 
elevates itself into ascendancy over the legislature. As is usual with 
an institution not cut to blue-print, neither is supreme and fortunes 
vacillate.62 The words "judicial" and "political" roughly mark out 
spheres of influence; and· even if their contours respond to attitudes, 
their compulsions are never completely spent. It seems clear that the 
legislature should settle- or should decree a way of settlement for-
disputes political in character. It might go so far as to deny any judicial 
review of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the "'ages 
and Hours Division, or the National Labor Relations Board; for there 
appears no persuasive reason to deny Congress the power to say that 
a particular matter is ineptly handled by legal, or could be better handled 
by administrative, process. 63 The primary allocation of work according 
to type seems clearly to belong to the law-making arm. But a narrowing 
of the Court's province is not to dispute its finality; a legislative policing 
58. See Feller, Admi11istrative Law Investigation Comes of Age (1941) 41 CoL. L. 
REv. 589, 599 (" .•. the creation of the more controversial of these agencies was brought 
about by an e.'\.-plicit fear of the bias of the judiciary."). 
59. See F. T. C. v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421 (1920) ; McFARLAND, JuDICIAL Co:~TROL OF 
THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMISSION AND THE INTERSTATE Co:-.tMERCE Co!ntiSSIO!> (1933). 
60. A case in point is REV. STAT. § 3224. See note 165 infra. 
61. If any judicial review is afforded, it will encompass the question o£ acting \Yithin 
the scope of the statute. And even if review is denied, courts might still intervene by 
eA.-traordinary writ. See pp. 1372-73 infra. 
62. See generally JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JuDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941). 
63. This is not to say that even the present Court, or Congress for that matter, is 
prepared to go so far. The judicial tradition is still powerful in its weight. And C\"en 
if judicial review were denied directly, tl1c e."traordinary writs to protect the indhidual 
against star chamber proceedings would remain. See pp. 1372-73 it:fra. The main 
point is that government is frequently partisan, and if it deliberately wishes to enforce 
its partisanship to the hilt, the judiciary hardly bespeaks realism if it insists that p:lrti-
sanship has no place in American life. Sec McGowen, Til£' Battle of tl1e Prot:£'ss£'s (19-10) 
28 CALIF. L. REv. 217. 
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of its dicta- though now and then proposed by some adventurous soul 
- is in no immediate prospect. 64 The two departments remain coor-
dinate, even though each retains only a qualified independence. In the 
question-begging statement of old "each is sovereign in suo regno." 
Beyond the general lines marked out by Congress, the Court is umpire 
between competences in conflict. If only the matter appears before it 
in proper habiliments, it can mark lines about its own discretion. oG The 
checks are only such stops in tradition, process, and political theory as 
it may set up for its guidance. To this end it can put to fresh employ-
ment the ancient requirements of "standing to sue," "case or contro-
versy," and "justiciable issue." Such terms are inert things, responsive 
to the flexible will of jurists. They may be employed to protect the 
court against the trivial and the frivolous, or to avoid meeting issues 
which may prove embarrassing. But, as the criteria of jurisdiction, such 
tests can be made to serve admirably as standards of competence. 
An established check on the Court's jurisdiction is "the political 
question." Among the oldest of judicial folk-ways, it has no specific 
warrant in the Constitution. It derives by implication from the separa-
tion of powers and connotes an issue in and· of itself not justiciable, a 
something left after the legal aspects of a cause in action have been 
cleared up. The matter is as completely within the discretion of another 
agency as to present a no-trespass sign to the courts. A political question 
has no certain norm and is not easily to be isolated from the contro-
versy in which it is set. A bench which finds all sorts of commitments 
to policy in the Constitution will find little scope - save as a necessary 
escape- in such a sanction; a bench which believes that the general 
welfare has been entrusted to legislature and the governmental establish-
ment will find much. A solicitude towards an unhampered operation 
of agencies of government within the appointed provinces could find no 
more fitting instrument, and in recent months an area recognized as 
political has been enlarged by the Court.66 A residuum of non-judicial 
64. Aside from the suggestions made at the time of the Court Unpacking Bill, note 12 
supra, Theodore Roosevelt and Robert LaFollette were almost the only ones to suggest 
drastic reform. 
65. It is important to note that the Court in decreeing its own competence is, except 
in cases coming from state courts, also setting limits to the competence of the federal 
judiciary. But even within its own special realm it may protect its own competence-
competence to handle the work given to it. Long ago, it sought to reduce the quantity 
of its work. See FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BusiNESS OF TliE SuPREME CounT 
(1927) c. 7. A wide tolerance lies between the handful of appeals it must accept and 
the host of cases it may at its pleasure review. It may accordingly choose to limit its 
docket to the issues it can best handle. But it must, at the same time, not shut off cases 
incompetently handled by lower federal courts. To do this would be ostrich-lik~. 
66. See cases cited in notes 43, 44 supra. Here "political" refers to justiciability. 
The "political" nature of issues which must be passed on is something else again. It 
goes without saying that this has been enlarged. See note 82 infra. 
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power over policy- large or small as the bench makes it- is to be 
unquestioned in any manner. 
A kindred- at times overlapping- device is "the genuine case or 
controversy." Often the legal controversy is only the rhetorical shell of 
a policy question. A suit has been trumped up in order that the Court 
may pronounce valid or null-and-void some legislative act.ui If the 
matter must be resolved by combat at law, the less encumbered the 
issue, the better. But, if the Court regards a choice between alternative 
ways of serving the common good as no concern of its own, it may 
strip away the trappings as sheer disguise, discover the real issue to lie 
beyond its competence as a court, and refuse to entertain the suit. On a 
number of recent occasions the Court has split upon whether it would 
entertain a plea it was bound to reject or bluntly refuse to listen.Gs 
Justice Frankfurter protested vigorously that the Court should lend no 
encouragement to an attempt to set aside a state law when the attempt 
was predoomed to failure; and to the argument that, because the record 
had been incorrectly built, it would have to remand he replied that the 
Court could invoke the ancient powers of the Chancellor "as though 
the suit were before him de no'Z•o." 69 In another case, Justice Black 
insisted that the power of a state to prohibit a monopoly is unquestioned, 
and would indulge it no right of access to the courts for purpose of 
challenge.70 Although neither spoke for the majority, their dissents show 
clearly the direction of the judicial winds. As a question comes con-
sistently to be answered in the negative, it is only a question of time 
before the Court refuses to allow it to be raised. Even where there is 
a question of substance which it must eventually entertain, the device 
can be employed to delay action until it emerges in a genuine law-suit.11 
A premature consideration means an issue-in-the-abstract; a deferment 
means that the policy in question has time to prove its worth in practice 
before having to undergo judicial scrutiny. Thus the "case or contro-
versy" may be used to evade, to limit jurisdiction, to defer judgment, 
to mark out lines of competence. 
The technical requirement of standing to sue is a variant of the same 
symbol. Like the case or controversy requirement it is a convenient 
67. See }AcKsox, THE STRUGGLE FOR Jumci.\L SuPREM.\cr (1941) c. IX. 
68. See Beat v. :Missouri P. R R, 312 U. S. 45 (1941); ~[ayo \'. Lakeland High-
lands Canning Co., 309 U. S. 310 (19-m); Gibbs Y. Buck, 307 U. S. 66 (1939); Polk 
v. Glover, 305 U. S. 5 (1938) ; cf. Driscoll Y. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U. S. liM 
(1939). 
69. Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U. S. 310, 322-(1940). 
70. Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U. S. 66, 77 ct seq. (1939). 
71. "Passing upon the possible significance of the manifold pro\isions of a br~Jad 
statute is analogous to rendering an advisory opinion upon a statute or a declaratory 
judgment upon a hypothetical case.'' Watson v. Buck, 9 l 1• S. L. WE£R 4339, 4341 ( U. S. 
1941). 
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device to shield the executive and legislative action against judicial attack. 
Yet here again, it may be only another technical way of saying that the 
business in question is not the concern of the Court. As -an open forntula 
it does on occasion serve as a test of the Court's competence. For, where 
the issue concerns the internal operations of government, it is clearly 
inadvisable for the judiciary to interfere, while the imposition of con~ 
fiicting commands by separate agencies makes its intervention neces~ 
sary.72 That, in the one instance, the aggrieved party lacks and in the 
other possesses standing to sue is commonsense. The criterion is whether 
the litigant has any business inquiring into the matter. But, such in~ 
stances aside, the doctrine is little more than a convenient judicial tool 
which is employed rather to inhibit action when the Court regards itself 
as incompetent than as a measure of its distinctive competence.73 
But criteria do not lie upon a single level; other values may be invoked 
to assume or to reject cases. Tempo may be endowed with consequence. 
The process of justice is avowedly, necessarily, empirically "decorous." 
Its office is to provide a forum for a judicious survey of a course 'Of 
action, to assess departures from norms of equity, to decree whatever 
punitive, remedial and preventive measures the situation commands. It 
has, so far as it can make use of improvised tools, attempted to cover 
the period pendente lite with a hasty answer.74 It has, with much stress 
and strain, failed to accommodate its procedures to the streant of activ~ 
ities which attest a going business in an intricate industrial society. Hel'e 
a continuous supervision, a constant adjustment, a detail of decisions 
- of little consequence in the instance, yet amounting to a policy in the 
aggregate- present a demand which cannot be met from the bench. 
If private equities must be scrupulously respected and still a public over~ 
seer is essential, the answer is the administrative tribunal. Yet this 
hybrid invention has not been watched over with an eye single to its 
function. Instead its performance has been seriously compromised by 
trespass upon its process and territory. The judiciary, suspicious of an • 
upstart, has attempted to impose a procedure which grew up under other 
condit~ons. And business. enterprise, anxious to escape agencies which 
72. Compare Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113 (1940), discussed in note 
44 supra, with United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U. S. 534 (1940). The 
latter case is not, strictly speaking, one involving conflicting commands because both 
agencies urged identical interpretations of the statute. But the type of issue is one requir-
ing )udicial resolution. 
73. See Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. T. V. A., 306 U. S. 118 (1939); Duke 
Power Co. v. Greenwood, 302 U. S. 485 (1938); Alabama Power Co., v. Ickes, 302 
U. S. 464 (1938). See Moore and Adelson, The Supreme Court: 1938 Term (1939) 
26 VA. L. REv. 1, 67. Cf. Shulman, Book Revie\v (1937) 15 No. CAR. L. REv. 309, 311, 
n. 5. 
74. Interlocutory orders, particularly temporary injunctions, are judges' answers to 
the cry of tardiness. 
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it could not control, has sought to dissipate command into an intermin-
able ceremonial. Thus the ancient law court, which it was the very 
purpose of the new tribunals to escape, would be on its way to a return. 
If judicial review is added to administrath·e process, year follows year 
while a single question in a course of hurried events awaits decision. 
The resulting delay, devastating in its incidence, has been remarked in 
militant terms by members of the present bench.7u The demand for 
speed is an important term in the equation of competence. As judicial 
etiquette now goes, it cannot be accorded formal recognition, but it has 
of late made a lusty appearance upon the plane which underlies "the 
opinion of the Court." 76 Other vehicles are at hand for carrying its 
value; the finding of the administrative body has a weight; the chancellor 
has his zone of discretion in respect to stay or injunction. 
A close ally to speed is e..'\.-pertness. The decision should come from 
a..'ll authority whose answer can be relied upon. The delegation of power, 
the specialization of office, the establishment of separate controls, has 
been intended to refer decisions of various sorts to agencies most com-
petent to make them. The trend has been to recognize an intermediate 
term between "the la\v" and "the facts." A knowledge of the subject, 
an understanding of the process in which it is set, a feel for the intan-
gibles which comes out of e..'\.-perience are factors in the judgment. 11 They 
never become quite articulate; they are indigenous to the administrative 
process and not easily transplanted to another forum. As the case goes 
up, such considerations tend to fade from the record; the Court handles 
a matter which lacks a dimension present at the more secular hearing 
below.78 An oblivion to the unlikeness between the administrative and 
the judicial process comes easily to lawyers who think of Court redew 
only as a further series of steps in a single process. And this failure 
to distinguish in kind- studied or obtuse- is accompanied by demands 
for a wide-open door to judicial appeal. As the work of the agency 
increases in magnitude and comple..~ity, the qualitative difference between 
75. See :Mr. Justice Black dissenting in McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 
U. S. 419, 423-27 (1938). Cf. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Oklahoma Packing Co. 
v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U. S. 4, 5 (1940) ("The case concerns a rate con-
troversy which has been winding its slow way through state and federal courts for 
thirteen years."). See also Mr. Justice Brandeis in St. Joseph Stocl.."Y3l"ds v. United 
States, 298 U. S. 38, 8~93 (1936). 
76. See Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U. S. 4 (1940) ; 
see cases cited in notes 223, 225 infra; cf. cases cited in notes 50, 51 supra. 
77. ". . . all are part of the imi>onderables which the Board was entitled to ap-
praise." N. L. R. B. v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U. S. 584, 599 (1941). See also the quotation 
in note 225 infra. 
78. Compare the approach to the problem in Railroad 'Comm. of Te.-ms v. Rowan 
& Nichols Oil Co., 311 U. S. 570 (1941) with tltat in ~{organ v. United States, 30-t 
U. S. 1 (1938). And see note 225 infra. 
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the two processes becomes more obvious; and of this difference in kind 
the Court is in time bound to take effective notice.70 It was bound 
to discover that trial at law fails to serve the administrative process in 
the search for the substantive result, and remains valuable only as a 
guarantee of orderly process. There is nothing to stop the Court- what· 
ever form of words it employs- from refusing to exercise its authority 
when it distrusts its own judgment. The Congress, to whom the power 
properly belongs, may reapportion labors and impose upon the Court 
a task it is reluctant to assume. But its authority is buttressed by intri-
cate technology and favorable presumption, and its ingenuity can always 
rise to a refusal to march where it fears to tread. 
The criterion of judgment by the expert is not limited to administra· 
tion. The will of the people, in spite of its omniscient quality, is supposed 
to be informed; the laws of the land are presumed to emerge from a 
process which turns knowledge to full account. The direct responsibility 
for a statute belongs to the legislature; the social need has come to it; 
its concern is with an over-all view of the situation, the factors in conflict, 
the alternative proposals. It has the facilities for gathering facts, 
diagnosing maladies, prescribing remedies. The Court is limited to such 
values, materials, considerations as can be crowded into the narrow con· 
fines of a suit at law. In respect to interstate trade barriers three members 
of the Court noted that Congress alone can "not only consider whether 
such a tax as now under scrutiny is consistent with the best interests of 
our national economy, but can also on the basis of full exploration of 
the many aspects of a complicated problem devise a national policy fair 
alike to the States and our Union." 80 Such a limitation upon judicial 
vision has traditionally been set down in shorthand as "the presumption 
of constitutionality"; but the indulgence of such a presumption has usually 
stopped short of its implications. Mr. Justice Black thrust at its vested 
logic when he questioned the Court's action in requiring a hearing on 
the validity of a state statute, passed unanimously in one house, with a 
single vote contra in the other, and approved by the governor. After 
noting the competence of the legislature to appraise facts and resolve 
conflicts of interest, and commenting upon "the careful and cautious 
consideration given to the matter," he accused the Court of using judicial 
review to weigh again the pros and cons of the measure. 81 Again and 
79. "It will bear repeating that although the administrative process has had a differ-
ent development and pursues somewhat different ways from those of courts, they arc to 
be deemed collaborative instrumentalities of justice and the appropriate independence of 
each should be respected by the other." United States v. Morgan, 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4336, 
4338 (U. S. 1941). See also United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183, 191 (1939). 
80. McCarroll v. Dixie • Greyhound Lines, 309 U. S. 176, 189 ( 1940). 
81. Polk v. Glover, 305 U. S. 5, 16 (1938). 
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again, for the majority as well as in dissent, justices haYe disclaimed 
the competence of the Court in this field.82 
In the shift to a new base, the solicitude for a full record plays a part. 
If the issue is to be entertained, it must be the real issue, not a mere 
legalistic question. To that end the bench must be as fully informed 
as the body whose judgment it reviews; a complete picture demands 
an adequate recitation of fact and a realistic brie£.83 But all that is 
requisite to decision cannot be crowded into a legal document; the 
judicial process does not lend itself easily to policy making; the Court, 
without authority to create where it strikes down, is not at its best in 
a legislative role.84 The Brandeis brief- as argument or dissenting 
opinion- was invented as a defense against reading the preferences of 
justices into the Constitution. Its vogue was greatest when statutes had 
to run the gauntlet of null-and-void. As the minority has become the 
Court, it passes along with other assets of the dissent. It still serves a 
function in preserving to the cause at law the realities with which it 
is concerned.85 But affirmative use reveals clearly the half-way thing 
the device is. The demand for all that lies back of a legislative act is 
a demand for evidence that reasonable men might have passed it. That 
is to accord to the law-makers a wide zone of discretion; and that in 
turn is to say that in respect to the substanth·e question the legislature 
is more competent than the judiciary. Mr. Justice Black, for C.'i:atnple, 
finds distasteful the affirmative use of so compromising a device. He 
would go all the way, dismiss for want of jurisdiction, and deny to the 
Court the right to substitute its "right" and uwrong" for that of the 
82. See Olsen v. Nebraska, 61 Sup. Ct. 862, 865 (U. S. 1941), quoted supra note 3S; 
Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 445 (1940) ("Nothing en be less helpful 
than for courts to go beyond the e.-..:tremely limited restrictions [of] the Constitution 
. . . ") ; Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 394 (1940) ("Those 
matters . . . relate to questions of policy, to the wisdom of the legislation, and to the 
appropriateness of the remedy chosen-matters which are not for our concern.''); Osborn 
v. Ozlin, 310 U. S. 53, 66 (1940) ("All these are questions of policy not for us to 
judge.") ; :Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U. S. 310, 320 (1940) (''The 
wisdom of such a policy-its efficacy to achie,•e the desired ends-is of course not our 
concern."); McCarroll v. DL-..:ie Greyhound Lines, 309 U. S. 176, 189 (1940), quoted 
p. 1340 supra; Polk v. Glover, 305 U. S. 5, 16 (1938) ; Indiana v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 
117 (1938). 
83. ''Unless we know the facts on which the legislators may have acted, we can-
not properly decide whether they were (or whether their measures are) unreasonable, 
arbitrary or capricious. Knowledge is essential to understanding; and understanding 
should precede judging.'' Mr. Justice Brandeis dissenting in Burns Baldng Co. v. Bryan, 
264 u. s. 504, 520 (1924). 
84. Compare the statement of Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas, JJ., p. 1340 supra. 
85. See United States v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-55 (1938). 
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responsible authority. His argument takes "the de}llocratic process" more 
seriously than the doctrine of judicial review would allow. 80 
In fact, the theory of competence opposes the drive towards judicial 
review. Due process, equal protection, privileges and immunities are 
verbal counters; they are animated by the feeling that some authority 
ought to arrest legislation which has gone astray. In the good books, 
statutes emerge from an informed process of deliberation; in actual life 
they frequently are responses of the legislature to the pressure of inter-
ested groups. It has been argued by one, as distinguished in political 
science as he is in law, that "legislation is more and more the product 
of stark pressure with little or no reason admixed"; and that judicial 
review returns the process "to the test of deliberation, reason, principle 
and fact in an atmosphere of comparative detachment." 87 The assump-
tion of pure reason guiding deliberation may be outmoded; the Congress 
may be a forum in which interests, in accordance with their strength, 
register their various wills. Yet, the implications of such an argument 
have been only cautiously indulged by its proponents. If the Court is 
to strike down where the legislature inconsiderately acted, why should 
it not act where the legislature inconsiderately struck down? Even if 
the Court goes only half-way, it usurps a political office and becomes 
an additional custodian of the general welfare. It assumes the wisdom 
of legislation to be a thing apart from the process which engenders it. 
It is a denial of the validity of the democratic process. The logic of 
the contention carries its advocates farther than they want to go. 
In last analysis the aim of government is the satisfaction of the needs 
of the groups which make up the commonwealth. If a wise, disinterested 
and beneficent authority is at hand, the matter can be left to a third 
party. But when divine right- whether for King, God's vicar, Star 
Chamber or dictator- is at a discount, persons in interest must rely 
upon such processes as human frailities can devise. Individuals with 
like desires group themselves and articulate their demands. If a group 
finds itself opposed to another group, the number of possible modes of 
resolving the dispute is limited. Each can exact its own justice; a knock-
down and drag-out fight ensues; but this occurs only if government is 
impotent. A forum may be provided for a consideration of opposing 
views, and a decision reached. Or resort may be had to an arbiter. 
Such peaceful mediation is the essence of the judicial process. In indi-
vidual matters, and with norms acceptable to the community, it works 
well enough. But when bigger things are in order, the vehicle of adjudi-
cation becomes overloaded or refuses to accept the traffic. The issue 
may be novel and criteria of judgment uncertain; a submerged group, 
86. See the quotation infra note 122. Note that in the Carolene Procl11cls case 
Mr. Justice Black dissented from the part cited supra note 85. 
87. Dickinson, Due Process of Law (1939) No. CAR. B. A. Rru•. 133, 147. 
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becoming articulate, demands rights; the difference-it-makes reaches far 
and wide and out into the future. Here is too much of clash, the sub-
jective, the unlmown to be entrusted to arbitration. The demand is not 
for an answer, but for standards and values by· which answers are to 
be secured. In matters of individual satisfaction and group assertion 
no third party can decide. Instead, a forum for discussion and mutual 
consideration, can at least provide a mechanism for a resolution of con-
flicting demands. A democratic system converging into a legislative 
process, with the traditional complement of civil liberties, provides such 
an institution. It cannot respond to the aggregate will of a countless 
number of atomic individuals; a considerable amount of organization 
into pressure groups is the price of its operation. Its pressures count 
for more than numbers; the fault lies, not with the democratic process, 
but with the privileged structure of society which it reflects. And if 
voices are more confused than needs, the organization of opinion, rather 
than the process of law-making, is to blame. The state is a body of many 
members; and each of these must become articulate if the legislature is 
to consider its necessities. 
The judicial system is uniquely ill-adapted to handle pressure groups. 
After the last procedure has been invoked and the last substanth·e issue 
has been referred to the appropriate norm, the question of novelty has 
only emerged. A reference, rather than a result, is needed; and since 
abstract justice cannot supply it, it must emerge from a balance between 
pressures. The judicial process is based upon strength of argument; 
the presiding judge makes his decision upon his feeling as to how the 
matter ought to be. He is pent in by atmospheric influences emanating 
from the dominant group ; he is impelled to stay within the zone of 
tolerance marked out by public opinion. If, within these limits, he is 
free from partisan pressure, he is subject to the pressures of the past 
frozen into the legal code. The political process, by contrast, moves 
avowedly towards the recognition of new interests, the creation of new 
rights, the redefinition of the norms of justice. In its very nature there 
are no fixed standards by which its results can be measured. In an 
endless process, in which groups rise and fall, and interests refuse to 
become a stereotyped commonwealth, it must forever make articulate 
that which is inchoate. Even "the immutable principles of the Consti-
tution" cannot arrest the corrosion and renewal of social structure. 
The Court is now fumbling towards a recognition of the logic of its 
own position. If, when, as it comes, it will recognize that its compe-
tence comes up sharp at the boundaries of the substantive process of 
legislation. 
In sum these various elements are falling into a pattern of compe-
tence. In character they are not all of a kind; and the types of dispute 
which come into Court differ in quality as well as in degree. There is 
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accordingly variety in norm as well as variation in subject matter. Hence 
no logical scheme of categories can be imposed upon the scattered results. 
Again and again it will be set down that policy is for some other body 
and "not for this Court." But a major premise of competence and 
incompetence cannot of itself decree results. Instead of easy general~ 
ization, inquiry can garner no more than the sorts of things the Court 
finds within its own, and the sorts of things it sets down within the 
competence of others. 
IV. RETREAT FROM THE CoNSTITUTION 
At its hands "the law of the Constitution," as a body of substantive 
rules, is on the wane. Another bench, with a different conception of 
its own office, might impress a trim structure upon the whole domain 
of public policy. The current bench, through its self-denying ordinance, 
has mitigated the former pervasiveness of oversight. The line'S once 
maintained in sharp relief are now exposed to legislative change; and 
if many remain where once they were, their firm foundation in the 
supreme law of the land has been replaced by the precarious will of the 
legislature. The current position, however, bears the marks of being 
transitional. The Court has not formally surrendered its power; it docs 
not in general refuse to accept a case which raises a constitutional issue. 
But the older presumption of constitutionality has been elaborated into 
a technology by which review becomes little more than the fulfillment 
of traditional proprieties. For example, in the good old days the Court 
attempted to impose upon the several states the outline of a fiscal policy 
which in the name of justice outlawed "double taxation." 88 Its iron 
will was no match for the perplexing intricacies of a continental industry. 
The Court's intermittent stabs at an assortment of situations led to a 
hodge-podge of "rigid and artificial legal concepts" 80 which created as 
much confusion as it eliminated. Recently the Court has first in instances 
fallen back and next beaten a fast retreat from a battle-ground in which 
the terrain would not sustain its tread.90 There may be confusion, over-
lapping, injustice; but a situation out of hand cannot be corrected by 
the hit-or-miss of the instant case. Form, equity, precision can come 
only through such a complete overhauling as Congress alone can decree.91 
In respect to state burdens on interstate commerce, the Court is exer-
cising a similar, somewhat slower, and more orderly retreat. It will no 
88. See Collier, Shall the Courts or the State Legislatures Umpire Ta.r Jurisdiction 
Disputes? (1940) 8 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1179. 
89. Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. State Board of Tax Appeals, 307 U. S. 313, 323 (1939). 
90. See Withdrawal of Due Process Limitations 011 Stale Ta:r lurisdidio11 (1941) 
50 YALE L. J. 900; Collier, supra note 88. 
91. See Rodell, A Primer 011 Interstate Taxation (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1166, 
1181-85. 
HeinOnline  -- 50 Yale L. J. 1345 1940-1941
1941] SPECIAL COMPETENCE OF SUPREME COURT 1345 
longer invoke the commerce clause to protect corporations whose habitats 
are far from local from sharing in the assessments imposed by the 
state. 92 As yet diverse threads have not been woven into a strand that 
bears the authority of the Court. They concur that a state statute which 
on its face discriminates against a commerce which refuses to respect 
political boundaries is void.93 But beyond the vague contours of this 
. general utterance, the brethren are not in accord. Black, Frankfurter, 
Douglas, JJ., apparently feel that as soon as a controversy arises as to 
whether a statute, innocent on its face of such an intent, actually dis-
criminates in practice, tlte limit of the Court's competence has been 
passed.94 Although he would not go so far, }.fr. Justice Stone does 
insist upon a strong presumption in favor of the reasonableness of any 
state statute which impinges upon interstate trade.05 The other justices, in 
varying degrees, are more tolerant of judicial review; they feel a duty 
to keep commerce among the several states free of barriers.0a If an 
approach already manifest becomes dominant, the ,oversight of the federal 
system will be largely left to Congress.97 It seems tlte more competent 
to give full consideration to the many factors involved in national policy. 
In regard to tlte state's control of "its own economy," the Court has 
stayed its hands. The symbols of "due process" and "equal protection" 
once powerful to strike down, nowadays seem to e.xhaust their power 
m bringing issues under review. 98 A Court which is willing to admit that 
the wisdom of legislative acts is debatable, can claim for itself no 
92. The development is outlined in McGoldrick v. Bcnvind-White Coal :\lining Co., 
309 U. S. 33, 46 (1940) ("But it was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve 
those engaged in interstate commerce of their just share of state ta." burdens, ••• ~'). 
93. Best & Co. v. Ma.'-·well, 311 U. S. 454 (1940) ; Hale "· Bimco Trading Co., 305 
u. s. 375 (1939). 
94. Dissenting in :McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U. S. 176, 183 (HMO). 
95. See his opinions in South Carolina State H'w'y Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 31)3 
U. S. 177, 190-91 (1938) ; McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal ~lining Co., 309 U. S. 
33, 46ff. (1940) ; cf. his concurring opinion in McCarroll Y. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 
u. s. 176, 180 (1940). 
96. See the Chief Justice's dissent in McGoldrick \'. Berwind-White Coal 1!ining 
Co., 309 U. S. 33, 59 (1940) ; Mr. Justice Reed dissenting in West India Oil Co ...... 
Domenech, 311 U. S. 20, 29 (1940). Neither of these two concurred in the other's dis-
sent in the above two cases. :Mr. Justice Roberts, howe,·er, concurred in both dissents. 
Mr. Justice ~1urphy has not yet indicated his full-blown philosophy on trade barriers. 
97. For critical views see Dowling, [lifers/ale Coltlltlcrcc a11d Slalc Ptnt•cr {1940) 
27 VA. L. REv. 1; McAllister, Court, Co11grcss a11d Trade Barriers (1941) 16 I:m. L. J. 
144; Dickinson, The Fmzctiotzs of Co11grcss a11d the Courls in Umpiring tlzc Federal Sss-
tem (1940) 8 Gro. WAsH. L. REv. 1165. 
98. The cases upholding recent economic legislation under Ute Fourteenth Amend-
ment are too numerous to mention. The only Act to fail in the past two terms was by 
a divided Court, Black, Douglas, and ~furphy dissenting. Wood v. Lovett, 9 U. S. L 
\VEEK 4346 (U. S. 1941). And e\•en here it was Ute "obligation of contracts" clause 
which stood in the way, not the Fourteenth Amendment. 
HeinOnline  -- 50 Yale L. J. 1346 1940-1941
1346 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50: 1319 
exclusive competence to decide. It may admit that the local needs of a 
single state do not stand out in sharpest relief from Olympian heights.00 
And if remedies can not operate in the abstract, it may concede that 
the-man-an-the-spot is best able to judge impinging conditions.100 All 
along the front of state control the Court is falling back. A number 
of justices have apparently come to doubt the fear expressed by Mr. 
Justice Holmes when he said, "I do think the Union would be imperiled 
if we could not make that declaration [of unconstitutionality] as to the 
laws of the several States." 101 If it be once admitted that the Congress 
is competent to preserve the Union, 102 a self-assumed load of heavy 
responsibility is at ont;e lifted from the shoulders of the Court. In 
result the judicial arm ceases to be an impediment over which experi-
mental legislation may tumble.103 Yet, in spite of self-surrender, the 
Court reserves and exercises the power to strike down local economic 
legislation obviously aimed at discriminating against the outlander.101 
In its converse terl1).s of guarding the states from destruction this 
reservation of power to preserve the Union is less insistent. As long 
ago as the days of John Marshall, the Court insisted that the supremacy 
of the national government was not to be lightly set aside in the name 
99. Compare "Reading the Texas Statutes and the Texas decisions as outsiders with· 
out special competence in Texas law, we would have little confidence in our independent 
judgment •... " Railroad Comm. v. Pullman Co., 61 Sup. Ct. 643, 644 (U. S. 1941). 
100. Compare "Deeply imbedded traditional ways of carrying out state policy, • , • 
are often tougher and truer law than the dead words of the written text." Nashville C. 
& St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 369 (1940). 
101. CoLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920) 296. This is apart from the problem of conflict 
between state and federal laws. See pp. 1367-69 i11jra. 
102. Compare Chief Justice Marshall's distinction between federal taxation of state 
instrumentalities and state taxation of federal instrumentalities. McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 4 Wheat. 316, 435-36 (U. S. 1819). 
The recent cases on tax immunity present, incidentally, a brilliant example o£ the 
technique of judicial·retreat from the constitutional policy-making field. Marshall de· 
dared, perhaps as a dictum, that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy." [Id. 
at 431]. It came later to be argued that neither state nor nation could tax "the instru· 
mentality'' of the other. As instrumentality radiated by a kind of contagious magic, an 
artificial and unrealistic structure of immunities was created. [See Powell, A11 Imagiuar~• 
l!tdicial Opi11io11 (1931) 44 HARV. L. REv. 889]. By a simple approach, going back to 
Marshall, the Court has cut this intricate structure away. A person may receive his 
income from an instrument of government, but he pays his tax as an ordinary citizen. 
Congress may forbid or allow state taxation of its instrumentalities; states can do little 
to stop federal taxation of its instrumentalities. Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466 (1939); 
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 (1938). Although not stated in terms of compe· 
tence, the emerging rule clearly limits the discretion of the Court. It decrees an elemen-
tary pattern, and regards departures as matters of policy to be decreed by the legislature. 
103. See the quotation in note 121 i11fra. 
104. See Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 4;i4 (1940); Hale v. Bimco Trading Co., 
306 U. S. 375 (1939). See also note 115 i11jra. 
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of state's rights.105 As times have changed and issues have shifted, the 
terms of the formula for the division of power have undergone mutations 
of meaning, and Marshall's federal supremacy has sometimes been in 
eclipse.106 Yet, e..xcept for the lapse during early New Deal days, the 
policy sponsored by Mr. Chief Justice Taft of giving great weight to 
a Congressional· declaration of need for national action has been in the 
ascendancy.107 The current bench relies perhaps more heavily than ever 
before upon such declaration, 108 and yet is loath to take the last step and 
admit that a Congressional determination is final. It admits the com-
petence of the legislative branch, but attaches a string which keeps the 
last word within its own reach. If a state statute collides with an Act 
of Congress, and interpretation cannot trim the two to fit, the federal 
power has precedence.1on But the federal system is deeply grooved, and 
there doubtless remains a residual territory which the Court will presen·e 
to the states. The Sclzechter case110 must be read today with tlte gloss 
of a hundred opinions; but it probably still carries the meaning that to 
make Congress sovereign to the whole economy would doubtless com-
promise the Union.U1 In fact, however, the present bencl1 admits the 
power of Congress to mark out tlte field of its own competence.112 
Yet, if the Court rarely gives it e..xercise, it has not abdicated its veto 
power. This fact warrants the observation of the Attorney General that 
the victory of the President over the Court is "tentporary."113 It is not 
current usage, but authority in reserve which is important ; and, since 
the ways of the Court respond to a changing personnel, habits put off 
can easily be put on. The use of its power to strike dmm statutes which 
seek to preserve trade to citizens of the state against outsiders presents 
105. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1824) ; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 
419 (U. S. 1827) ; Willson v. The Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245 (U. S. 1829). 
106. See City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102, 130 (U. S. 1837); The License 
Cases, 5 How. 504 (U. S. 1847) ; Corwin, loc. cit. Sllfrra note 6. 
107. See Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1, 40 (1923); Corn-in, The 
Schechter Case-Laudmark, or What? (1936) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 151, 167-09. 
108. See Mr. Justice Douglas' discussion in Sunshine Anthracite Co:ll Co. v. Adkins, 
310 u. s. 381, 394-96 (1940). 
109. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 (1941). This assumes, of course, that the 
federal power is "granted" or "implied." 
110. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935). 
111. See Powell, Commerce, Peusious aud Codes II (1935) 49 HARY. L. Rv:. 193, 
205-13. 
112. One has only to glance at .the cases since 1937 upholding Congressional power. 
See, for example, Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson, 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4366 (U. S. 1941); 
United States v. F. W. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U. S. 100 (1941); United States v. 
Appalachian Power Co., 311 U. S. 377 (1940) ; Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co ...... Ad-
kins, 310 U. S. 381 (1940) ; United States v. Lowden, 308 U. S. 225 (1939) ; United 
States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, 307 U. S. 533 (1939). Sec Mr. Justice ~fcReynolds 
dissenting in N. L. R. B. v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601, 614 (1939). 
113. ]Acx:soN, THE STRUGGLE FOR JuDICIAL SUI'REMACY (1941) ,-i. 
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an easy temptation. Such a veto has a great tradition behind it; the 
cordon of state barriers at political boundaries was a dominant factor 
whi~h provoked the Constitution into being.114 And even though in this 
field Congress might be left to do the kind of job the Fathers performed 
"in Philadelphia, the supreme law of the land already gives the warrant, 
and the Court does not step outside its office to stay a short-sighted and 
pressure-ridden state legislature.115 But statutes are rarely so sharply 
drawn as to serve a single objective; disputes can arise as to legisla-
tive intent and it can be argued that the outlander is only a burnt offering 
on the altar of some legitimate cause.116 The graduation is easy; through 
such an inviting breach the Court may go far in the assertion of its 
power. If again it sallies militantly forth, it can easily pass beyond the 
limits of its competence; and through due process, the commerce clause, 
the reserved rights of the states- brightly furbished up for a new 
crusade- exalt sterilizing legalisms as the law. 
Apart from such an overlapping area, the criteria of competence should 
hold the Court well aloof from general legislation. A growing recog~ 
nition of stresses and strains in the national economy enlarges the orbit 
of federal power ;117 and more and more the states are called upon to 
fill in the detail of policies emanating from Washington.118 It is essen-
tial that the two controls be exercised with as much consistency and as 
little friction as may be. But such adaptation was well along before 
the Court noticed it ;119 it is singularly barren of justiciable issues; its 
114. See Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511, 523 (1935) ("The Constitution was 
framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed 
upon the theory that the people of the several states must sink or swim together, and 
that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union not division."). 
115. "State regulations affecting interstate commerce, whose purpose or effect is to 
gain for those within the state an advantage at the expense of those without, • • • have 
been thought to impinge upon the constitutional prohibition even though Congress has not 
acted." South Carolina State H'w'y Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 184 n. 
(1938). The Court went on to give the reason for this. "Underlying the stated rule has 
been the thought, often expressed in judicial opinion, that when the regulation is of such 
a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action 
is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on 
legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state." Ibid. Cf. McCar-
roll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U. S. 176, 189 (1940), quoted p. 1340 supra. 
116. Consider the dispute over the question of discriminatory taxation in McCarroll 
v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U. S. 176 (1940). 
117. "The purge of nation-wide calamity that began in 1929 has taught us many 
lessons. Not the least is the solidarity of interests that may once have seemed to be 
divided. . . • Spreading from state to state, unemployment is an ill not particular but 
general, which may be checked, if Congress so determines, by the resources of the Nation." 
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 641 (1937). Cf. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke 
Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937). 
118. See MAcDONALD, FEDERAL Am (1928) pp. 2-4, 13, 271; KEY, Tn£ AnMINISTltA-
TION OF FEDERAL GRANTS TO STATES (1937) cc. I, XII. 
119. See Mr. Justice Stone in United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 85-86 (1936). 
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problems have been called "political questions." 120 \Vithin its shrinking 
domain, the state should be master of its own public policy. With the 
art of control backward, there must be e..'\.-periment ;121 and the political 
process, far more than the judicial, leaves the way open for retreat ami 
a fresh start. An occasional veto from 'Washington merely obtrudes a 
disturbing element into a course of events the Court is powerless to 
direct; in its corrective touch it is a denial of the whole democratic 
system of legislation by popular pressures. In a changing culture "our 
traditional mode of life" is not the most meaningful of terms; but if, 
in nation and state, the economy is to be kept fle..~ible enough to preserve 
personal opportunity, the dominant reliance must be upon the legisla-
ture.122 For the Court to attempt to hold the pattern of national life true 
to the American ideal would be to adventure far beyond the frontiers 
of judicial competence. 
V. CITADEL OF THE ANCIENT LIBERTIES 
Although in fact the Court makes the legislature supreme in matters 
of policy, it has been unwilling to make definitive its presumption that 
a statute is constitutional. Its position may be due to a desire to keep 
its rule of review uniform and its reluctance to abandon its veto in issues 
of civil rights. A few years ago a bench headed by the present Chief 
Justice read "liberty of contract" out of the due process clause and 
promptly read freedom of speech into its place.123 The current bench, 
accentuating a trend which for a decade has been in the making, has 
in effect set up a presumption of unconstitutionality against all legisla-
tion which on its face strikes at freedom of speech, press, assembly, or 
religion.124 At the same time, while degrading substantive, it has e.xalted 
procedural due process- at least in instances where a natural person 
120. See McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U. S. 176, 189 (1940). Cf. ).[assa-
chusetts v. :Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 4..QJ (1923). For dissenting views see :McAllister and 
Dickinson, supra note 97. 
121. "There must be power in the States and the ~ation to remould, through c.-..peri-
mentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic 
needs." ~Ir. Justice Brandeis dissenting in New State Ice Co. , .• Liebman, 285 U. S. 
262, 311 (1932). 
122. "On remand of petitioners' bill which fails to show that the Florida law is in-
valid, may the Court, on evidence outside this bill, hold that the law violates due pro-
cess because the court is convinced that the legislature might have chosen a wiser, less 
expensive and less burdensome regulation? If a Court in this case and under this bill 
has this power, this final determination of the wisdom and choice of legislative policy 
has passed from legislatures-elected by and responsible to the people-to tbc Courts." 
Mr. Justice Black dissenting in Polk v. Glover, 305 U. S. 5, 18 (1938). 
123. Compare O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., :?82 U. S. 251 (1931) 
with Near v. :Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). See Shulman, i11jra note 131. 
124. See (1940) 40 CoL. L. REV. 531. 
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had been denied counsel,l2r; a jury of his peers/20 an atmosphere of 
decorum or some other requisite of a fair triaP27 Not infrequently the 
Court has been faced with statutes which in letter made all equal before 
the la\v, yet in actual operation became instruments of discrimination.128 
In one realm it must look into the detail of trials for crime ;120 in 
another into the detail of the administration of a law.13° For the con~ 
sideration of such minutiae, its door must be capable of being flung 
wide open. A rule of jurisdiction in terms of types of causes invites 
disturbing questions; a general invitation, and discretion as to what 
presumptions will be indulged serves the same result. 
Yet holdings rebut appearance; few of the justices would now assert 
that the Court extends equal courtesy to the person natural and the 
person corporate or that civil rights obtain access no more easily than 
liberties of property. The distinction has evoked- and provoked-
numerous attempts at rationalization.131 Some have been content to say 
no more than that the ancient liberties of the folk are "more funda~ 
mental" than those which relate to business and hence must be more 
zealously guarded by the courts.132 A supporting buttress is that the 
125. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932). 
126. Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 
(1939); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935). 
127. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923). 
128. See, e.g., the cases cited supra note 126. 
129. See White v. Texas, 310 U. S. 530 (1940); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 
(1940) ; and cases cited supra note 126. ' 
130. "Though the law itself be fair on its face . . . , yet, if it is applied and adminis~ 
tered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, • . . , the denial of 
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution." Yick \Vo v. Hopkins, 
118 u. s. 356, 373 (1886). 
131. Apart from judicial utterance, see Shulman, The Supreme Court's Allillldc 
toward Liberty of Co11tract aud Freedom of Speech (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 262; L1:.:VY, 
OuR CoNSTITUTION: TooL oR TESTA:IIOUNT (1941) 256-64; ]ACKSON, TuE STRUGGLE 
FOR JuDICIAL SuPREMACY (1941) 284-85; cf. Powell, Cha11gi11g Co11slitutio1tal Phases 
(1939) 19 B. U. L. REv. 509, 531 ("yet on both sides the paradox is more apparent than 
real."). For criticism of attempted rationalizations see Commager, Book Review, N. Y. 
TIMES, March 30, 1941, § 6, p. 16; LERNER, IDEAS ARE WEAPONS (1939) 66-68. 
132. "Freedom of speech and freedom of the press cannot be too often invoked as 
basic to our scheme of society." Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Milk Wagon Drivers Union 
v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287, 299 (1941). "This nation relies upon public 
discussion as one of the iudispeusable means to attain correct solutions of problems of 
social welfare ..... Our whole history teaches that adjustment of social relations through 
reason is possible while free speech is maintained." Mr. Justice Reed dissenting in the 
same case at 567. The First Amendment is "the jonndatio11 upon which our governmental 
structure rests and without which it could not continue to endure as conceived and 
planned." Mr. Justice Black also dissenting at 559. "The maintenance of the oppor~ 
tunity for free political discussion . . . , is a /tmdamCIItal principle of our constitutional 
system." The Chief Justice in Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369 (1931). (Ita!~ 
ics added in all quotations). 
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Constitution in specific terms outlaws abridgment of civil rights while 
whatever protection it decrees for property is set down in terms vague 
enough to invite a wide discretion.133 The argument is not proof against 
possible attack. As history it is open to qualification; the verbal lineage 
of the due process clause runs back to the Bill and the Petition of Rights; 
and the men who presented those documents to "tyrannical" kings were 
as much concerned with "liberties" in respect to their "estates" as in 
respect to their religion. It has also its e.-x:igetical difficulties; one wonders 
how rights so fundamental managed to find their habitation within the 
same vague terms of "due process" now set down as a part of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Although there is notl1ing e.'\.-plicit tl1ere, and 
a prohibition on federal now emerges as a limitation upon state action, 
we are told that the matter is too well-settled for discussion.13" Yet, 
in a series 9f steps, the process of transference can be traced;13::; as an 
example of borrowing and adaptation of doctrine, it is of a kind with 
reading laissez-faire into the supreme law of the land. In the one case 
there is nothing more obvious, natural, or ine,·itable than in tl1e other. 
It has the character, too, of inviting an overt e.xercise of judgment. 
The several ancient liberties were never absolute; and, as caught up in 
the generic term liberty, they do not completely escape the finite. The 
Court has never said, the current bench is unlikely to say, tltat e.xecutive 
and legislature may never interfere with a person's freedom.136 In this 
light, although instances may range as widely as the colors in a spectrum, 
the action of the state must be measured against the invasion of private 
right, and the issue becomes a matter of more or less. Y ct it is this 
very process of weight and balance which tlte Court seeks to avoid in 
ordinary Iegislation.137 The legislature which abridges freedom of speech 
is convinced that its a~tion is necessary in the given instance. \Vhen the 
Court enters a denial, it sets its judgment against tltat of a coordinate 
133. "There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitu-
tionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition o£ the 
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, . . . " ~[r. Justice Stone in 
United States v. Carotene Prod. Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152n (1938), citing two opinions oi 
Chief Justice Hughes, Stromberg v. California, 28J U. S. 359, 369-70 (1931) ; Lo\·cll v. 
Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 452 (1938). 
134. "It is now too well settled to require citation that by the Fourteenth Amendment 
the guaranties of the First Amendment are protected against abridgment by the states." 
Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287, 301, n. 3 (1941). 
135. See ·warren, The Ne-& "Liberty" U11dcr the Fourtce11th Amendment ( 1926) 39 
HARv. L. REv. 431. 
136. "The right [of free speech] is not an absolute one, and the State in the e.xcrcise 
of its police power may punish the abuse of this freedom." Stromberg v. Caliiornia, 233 
U. S. 359, 368 (1931). See also ::-.rr. Justice Frankfurter in ~[ilk Wagon Drivers Union 
v. !lfeadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 2I37, 299 (1941). and in ~1inemille School Dist. v. 
Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 596, 600 (1940). 
137. See cases cited in note 82 supra. 
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arm of government. To defend its action by invoking the word "funda-
mental" is only to state its result. 
The Court must also exercise independent judgment in deciding whether 
an issue is one of civil rights.138 A couple of generations ago, in an 
America which was on the make, personal freedom was esteemed as 
opportunity in a land of promise. To the mind of Mr. Justice Field, 
liberty-and-property was a single word and he did not hesitate to read 
the right to get ahead into the Fourteenth Amendment.130 But the idiom 
of ultimates changes and common-sense goes along. A peaceful picket-
ing, for which fifty years ago the law would have been hard put to find 
a place, is today an attribute of freedom of speech.140 But peace has 
no fixed truce with the picket line, and, as little by little violence ob-
trudes, all the activity it touches is put beyond the law.w The Court, 
by its own decrees, must separate into antithetical categories when there 
are no certain criteria of distinction.142 Today there are persons, whom 
the members of the Court would not consider unreasonable men, who 
regard the matter as an aspect of a clash between economic groups 
which the state should regulate.143 And men not devoid of reason argue 
that when the National Labor Relations Board forbids an employer to 
send anti-union pamphlets to his own employees, there is no denial of 
the traditional freedom of the individual.144 To accept the thesis that 
such questions fall within the discretion of the Court, is to accord defer-
ence to an ultimate. 
Members of the Court have been bothered by their own dichotomy. 
Mr. Justice Stone has preferred reasons for subjecting "to more exacting 
judicial scrutiny" statutes which affect civil liberties.140 Some of these 
138. Compare Comment, The Compulsory Flag Salute i1~ the Supreme Court (1940) 
9 I. J. A. BuLL. 1, 12 ("the Court did not follow the lead of some state tribunals which, 
in questioning the validity of the religious scruple against saluting, have opened the way 
to facile rejection of religious claims through simple denial that any religious scruple is 
'in realty' involved."). 
139. See his dissenting opinions in the Slaughter House cases, 16 Wall. 36, 83 (U. S. 
1873); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 140, 142 (1877); cf. his opinion for the Court in 
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31-32 (1885). 
140. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940). 
141. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287 {1941). 
142. "Such an adjustment requires austere judgment, ... " /d. at 556. "But I am 
not satisfied with the entire austerity theory. For anyone to transcend his own convic-
tions in the way Holmes is reported to have done would be more than human-and 
Holmes was always human." LERNER, IDEAS ARE WEAPONS (1939) 66. For a recent 
defense of the "austerity theory" see Shulman, Book Review ( 1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1307, 
1310. 
143. See Gregory, Peaceful Picketi11g and Freedom of Speech (1940) 26 A. B. A. 
]. 709. 
144. See Greene, Civil Liberties aud the N. L. R. B. (1940) 8 I. J, A. BuLL. 89, 
99-100. 
145. United States v. Carotene Prod. Co., .304 U. S. 144, 152n. (1938). 
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rights, he ventures, have unique iQlportance because their denial tends 
to restrict "those political processes which can ordinarily be e.xpected 
to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation." 146 In effect such a 
statement commutes the due process of the common law into an over-all 
safeguard for a democratic form of government. It has often been 
pointed out by those learned in the annals that in its origin due process 
meant no more than that actions of the government must be according 
to rule ;147 that, whether life or property was erroneously taken was of 
no consequence, if only the legal ceremonial were properly fulfilled. 
"'When the Court voids a conviction obtained by duress, sets aside a 
verdict because negroes were e.xcluded from the jury, or decrees a new 
trial after the accused has had time to prepare his case, it invokes the 
established sanction.148 IVIr. Justice Stone brings the germ to maturity 
in a due process for democracy in action. He would keep open the right 
of intellectual search and maintain a free forum for the interchange of 
ideas and the resulting action. That done, it is not of judicial concern 
that mistakes are made, provided the rules of the game are followed. 
A people through repeated trial and corrected error must work out its 
own salvation. 
Such a rationale has relatively easy going so long as it is limited to 
the democratic process. It encounters obstacles as soon as it leaves its 
procedural orbit. A "prejudice against discreet and insular minorities 
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation 
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minor-
ities."149 A group, for instance, may be within the nation, not of it. 
It may refuse, or be unable, to entertain commerce in "reason" with 
the mass of persons whose will guides the state. It may even be intent 
upon ignoring the ballot-box in a determination to acl1ieve its own re-
forms.. Such a group is always under suspicion; it is asldng quite a 
bit of the majority to make a place in the democratic system for those 
who will have nothing to do with the democratic process.1co In an 
extreme case freedom of speech for the militant fraction might even 
146." Ibid. ''It is an unreal and illogical distinction. It is unreal because it implies 
that economic progress has been retarded by the damming up of political channels; the 
reverse is more nearly true. It is illogical because it proclaims faith in democratic pro-
cesses for some purposes but distrust of them for others." Commager, supra note 131. 
147. See Convin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law b£'/ore ill£' Cirtil War (1911) 
24 HARv .. L .. REV. 366; Den er dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Impro\·ement Co., 18 
How. 272 (U .. S .. 1856) .. 
148. See cases cited in notes 125, 126, 129 supra. 
149.. United States v. Carotene Prod. Co., 304 U. S. 144, 153n. (1938). 
150. For an argument that freedom of speech should be denied to those who preach 
denial of freedom of speech, see Ascoli, Freedom of Spe£'c!J (1940) 9 AM. SCHOLAn 97; 
cf. NIEBUHR, CHRISTIANITY AND PowER PoLITics (1940) 83-93. For a refutation of this 
view see MacLeish, Freedom to End Freedom (1939) 28 SUR\'EY GllAPmc 117. 
HeinOnline  -- 50 Yale L. J. 1354 1940-1941
1354 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50: 1319 
imperil democracy itself. I( as Mr. Justice Stone insists, civil rights 
are an instrument of the popular commonwealth, they can hardly be 
tolerated as threats to its operation. If then the line is crossed, the 
legislature can act for the protection of the state.1G1 But the line is vague; 
nerves or propaganda may lead to statutes when there is no real hazard; 
a moment of hysteria may touch off a grand witch hunt. The door is 
open to judicial scrutiny, by such norms as are at hand, in an atmosphere 
immune as may be to the panic without. There will be border-line cases; 
the Court must say "good" or "bad"; the judgment of "reasonable" or 
"unreasonable" must be pronounced upon acts of the legislature. Statutes 
must be assessed in terms of the emotional urge they house. In the end, 
the theory of Mr. Justice Stone, which attempts to insulate a procedure, 
endows the Court with, judgment upon the wisdom of legislation. 
Stone's is only the most articulate among current theories. Their 
number is legion; and, whether "fundamental," "specific," or resting 
upon a value so ultimate as to defy expression, they are variants of a 
single theme - that there are attributes of human activity which ought 
to be put beyond the reach of the majority and the will of the law-
making body. But the passive demand for restraint does not generate 
an active agent for its exercise. It offers no convincing argument that 
the protection of civil liberties lies within the distinctive jurisdiction of 
the Court. It does not prove that the matters at issue lie within the dis-
tinctive competence of a bench habituated to the law. In the instant 
a decision to uphold or to outlaw requires a weighing of the social 
need in an exercise of police power against the harmful abridgment of 
personal liberty.152 Nothing in the endowment, training, e.."<perience of 
judges suggests their superiority to the personnel of other agencies of 
control. The sole argument is their aloofness; they are not responsible 
to a people who, on occasion, may become a great beast; their tenure 
is not dependent on their decisions. But such a reason is subject to 
discount where judges hold for a span less than life; it disappears alto-
gether where their terms are short and they must be returned to their 
offices at the polls. Its vitality is at its crest in respect to members of 
the Supreme Court. 
It has greatest weight, where provinces are distinct- as when the 
Supreme Court sits -in judgment of the acts of the several states. In 
its current statement the Fourteenth Amendment is a national imposition 
of the minimum requisites of the democratic process upon the political 
sub-divisions of the Union. So long as the nation demands the preserva-
151. See note 136 S11Pra. 
152. "To maintain the balance of our federal system, in so far as it is committed to 
our care, demands at once zealous regard for the guarantees of the Bill of Rights and 
due recognition of the powers belonging to the states." Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. 
Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287, 297 (1941). 
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tion of traditional liberties within its parts, the Court must face a barrage 
of intricate problems. The cases which come along demand speed; there 
is always danger that the mischief is done before the invalid act is 
erased. They require the e..'\.-pert; a legal command is not to be taken 
at face value, the question is what it means in the situation. A formal 
question of freedom of the press may become so interwoven in an 
economic conflict as to lose its identity. Not the reference of instance 
to norm, but the resolution of a conflict of values set in a cultural 
matrix is involved. In most instances a recitation of fact would reveal 
the denial of a right, but the real question is the validity of such a 
denial. Here nothing less than an economic and social panorama would 
suffice to indicate the presence or absence of a uclear and imminent 
danger." 153 But the very habituation of judges to the precisions of 
legal process is a hazard to their recreation of the whole picture. And 
if the cloistered judge is able to etch in the background with all its 
tangibles and intangibles, the situation is likely to be of public k"llowledge. 
It is not keener vision or larger knowledge which sustains the Court's 
exercise of power; it is rather, that as the structure of government now 
goes, there is no other agency to which the task can be entrusted. Here 
competence is a mere derivation of the Court's power to say the last 
word.154 
As respects acts of Congress the Court's position is somewhat dif-
ferent. The statutes in question are not e..'\.-pressions of local sentiment; 
they emanate from the will of a nation. If they are e..'\.-pressions of 
prejudice and passion, or if they sanctify a crusade against any race 
or sect, their generating winds of opinion are country-wide. That the 
Court, which professes to guard against such dangers, is itself sus-
ceptible to such a contagion, the pages of the United States Reports 
adequately attest. 11m Nor is it obvious that in this larger domain, the 
153. The phrase is from Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United StJ.tes, 
250 u. s. 616, 627 (1919). 
154. Note the footnote at the very end of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in the 
Flag Sal11te case. "It is to be noted that the Congress has not entered the ficld of legis-
lation here under consideration." Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 600 
(1940). Does this imply that the Court acts, not because it is peculiarly competent, but 
because others have not taken over the task? 
155. See, e.g., E:r parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (U. S. 1869) ; Georgia v. StJ.nton, 
6 Wall. 50 (U. S. 1867) ; Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 {1917) ; AnA~s, THE Tm:.o::1y 
OF SOCIAL REvoLUTIONS (1913) 97. Compare the problem facing the Court in Ouninetti 
v. United States, 242 U. S. 470 (1917), involving Ute Mann Act. Congress had indicated 
clearly that the Act was aimed only at commercial prostitution. The Court rejected this 
and held it applicable to a couple voluntarily crossing a stJ.te border. ". . . it can 
hardly be doubted that . . . [the Court] was influenced by the disinclination to seem 
to condone a moral dereliction. . • • The Court desired to support religion in e\·ery way. 
It did not desire to connive at se."ual immorality in any way." Radin, Statutory Iut~r­
pretafiOI~ (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 863, 883n. 
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Court rather than Congress holds by prescriptive right the office of 
protector of ancient liberties. If they are fundamental in, or instru-
mental to, the operation of the commonwealth, that belief is as prevalent 
among legislators as among judges.11w To insist that five of a bench of 
nine be empowered to set aside the command of the two houses, approved 
by the President, is to set down a serious qualification upon the demo-
cratic process. The arguments for judicial control are that the matter 
calls for calm, unhurried thinking; that it substitutes the reference of 
a situation to established norms for a political resolution of competing 
pressures; and that judicial review gives a second chance to strike at 
attempts to curb personal liberties. But calm, unhurried thinking is 
not a necessary attribute of the judicial forum ;m the reference of the 
situation to norms reveals the same conflict of values; and review in-
volves the substitution of a judicial for a political determination. The 
task is, in an emergency, to alter the rules of democratic procedure, and 
that bears the ear-marks of a political question- a political question 
unique only in its importance. If, in last analysis, the reasonable man 
of the law is to decide, the Congress is as close to the will of the country 
as the majority of the Court. The "procedural freedom" which Mr. 
Justice Stone demands can be guaranteed by the legislature as well as 
by the judiciary; he asks only for a "more exacting scrutiny." 1G8 
Such contentions as these, it will be insisted, deny "the supremacy" 
of the Constitution. To this the proper retort is that there is no such 
question. As a written document the Constitution is a collection of 
sanctions. As an instrument of government it is an aggregate of usages, 
blessed by these sanctions, and shaped to the necessities of a developing 
nation. As circumstance passes, usages come, are developed, and fade. 
The power of the Court in respect to civil liberties is in a sense usurped; 
neither those who framed the First, nor those who copied from the Fifth 
into the Fourteenth Amendment, could have anticipated the unique 
province which the Court rules today. But that is not to call its authority 
illegitimate. In a going society all institutions which endure put off old 
duties and put on new ones.11m Such adaptation is inseparable from life. 
156. ". . . it must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the 
liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts." Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes in Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. May, 194 U. S. 267, 270 (1904). 
157. The impeachment of Justice Chase for his charge to a jury in 1803 Js a case 
in point. See 1 WARREN, THE SuPREME CoURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1928) 276-
92. Cf. Mr. Justice Cardozo's characterization of the Court's opinion in Jones v. SEC, 
298 U. S. 1 (1936). "A commission ... is likened with denunciatory fen/or to the 
Star Chamber of the Stuarts." !d. at 33. (Italics added). 
158. See the quotation on p. 1352 supra. It is true that the justice wants "judicial" 
scrutiny. But the point is that he distinguishes between the issues in a way that other 
agencies could also distinguish. 
159. Compare Llewellyn, The Constitutiott as att Institretiott (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 1. 
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And judicial supremacy, which has been achieved in a series of judg-
ments, can in this realm be as logically derived from clauses on parch-
ment as in any other. Its constitutional reference has been attained in 
the same way in which "the commerce clause" was accorded an e.xpand-
ing domain, "liberty of contract" was read into "due process.. and read 
out again, and the Tenth Amendment was stripped of a veto power 
put there by its interpreters.160 And if the Court should abandon to 
Congress the province of civil rights, the shift of power would presently 
come into accord with the usages of tlte Constitution. The Court would 
merely have changed its opinion as to its proper province; it would have 
appointed fresh limits' to its own competence. 
A paean of praise has recently been accorded the Court for its stal-
wart defense of personal liberties. But the province of civil rights has 
no natural frontiers; the power asserted here may easily be driven into 
domains now recognized as politicaJ.l61 If currently questions of policy 
do not lie within its distinctive competence, it is because its own will 
has made it so. The body which can pass can also repeal a self-denying 
ordinance. The technique of "passing upon cases as tltey arise" provides 
a perfect cover through whiclt an about-face can be executed without 
notice or hearing. A year ago a salute to tlte flag under duress indicated 
that even the current bench was willing to abate religious freedom when 
the salvation of our form of government was at stake.102 For the pro-
tection of the rights of men the people of the United States must look 
to the people of the United States.163 
VI. FRoM NuLL-ANn-Vom To ULTRA VIRES 
In spite of its professions, the Court has not ceased to be an agency 
of policy. If it has disclaimed the right to pronounce legislative acts 
null and void, it has retained tlte power to declare what they mean. 
As it has retreated from the constitutional, it has dug in along the statu-
tory front. There, witlt teclmiques accommodated to more minute work-
manship, it has resumed its work as overlord to commonwealtlt and the 
economy. In part at least, it cannot escape its current duties. As the 
160. See Feller, The Te11th Ame11dmc11t Retires (1941) 27 A. B. A. J. 223. 
161. To the argument that the legislature is irresponsible can be countered the query: 
'Vere the legislature to have the final word, would it not assume greater responsibility? 
Cj. :Mr. Justice Brandeis in St. Joseph Stoch-yards v. United States, 293 U. S. 3S, 92 
(1936) ("Responsibility is the great developer of men."). 
162. :Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940). 
163. ''If we are really so vicious that we can be saved only by nine or by fi\·e men 
in silk gowns in the District of Columbia, I fear that we are likely to continue in a 
bad way whatever the five or nine may do. Zeal for ch·il liberty must be more wide-
spread to be satisfactorily effective." Powell, A Co11slitutio11 for 011 Imlt'jillitc a1:d Ex· 
pa11di11g Future (1939) 14 WASH. L. RE\'. 99, lOS. 
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general provisions of the law are applied to situations which come into 
court, there must be an interpreter. That is not the task for the legis-
lature; besides, the enacting body has usually been dispersed and no 
longer may bear witness to its intent real or manifest. As to their own 
statutes, the highest courts of the several states are most competent; 
and so long as litigation is before local tribunals, they have the last 
word.164 Even where the diversity rule brings issues into federal courts, 
an attempt is made to keep discretion at home.100 But, where acts of 
Congress must be construed, the Court cannot escape responsibility. In 
many of these instances, there is no way for the Court to avoid rely-
ing on its own conception of the proper policy for the Government to 
follo\~.166 
The Court, as tradition demands, affects not to engage in such prac-
tices. ". . . It is not our function to engraft on a statute additions 
which we think the legislature log~cally might or should have made." 101 
"Our function ends with the endeavor to ascertain from the words used, 
construed in the light of the relevant material, what was in fact the 
intent of Congress." 168 Yet few of the brethren can view interpreta-
tion as so primitive and discretionless an exercise of mind. To an 
argument that failure of the Government to act was an admission of 
its lack of statutory authority, Mr. Justice Black replied, 11To assign 
reasons for such inaction is but to guess. And the guesses would doubt-
less vary almost in accordance with the preconceived notions of the 
guessers." 169 In whatever elementary terms the Court's task is put, the 
application of a Congressional command to a case or controversy employs 
an equation which contains many variables. 
164. The interpretation of a state statute is conclusively determined by the state court. 
See Watson v. Buck, 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4339, 4341 (U. S. 1941); Minnesota c.'r rei. Pear-
son v. Probate Court, 309 U. S. 270, 273 (1940). 
165. See Watson v. Buck, 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4339 (U. S. 1941); Arkansas Corpora-
tion Comm. v. Thompson, 61 Sup. Ct. 888 (U. S. 1941) ; Railroad Comm. of Texas v. 
Pullman Co., 61 Sup. Ct. 643 (U. S. 1941); Beat v. Missouri P. R. R., 312 U. S. 45 
(1941); Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U. S. 478 (1940). 
166. It is possible for a statute to be so clear that reasonable men cannot quarrel over 
its meaning. In such a case, if some persistent soul insists on litigating the issue, the 
Court has no need for peering into its inner-consciousness. But even crystal clarity is 
no guarantee of judicial abstention from legislation. Consider REv. STAT. § 3224. "No 
suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be main· 
tained in any court." [26 U. S. C. § 1543 ( 1934)]. Meaning could hardly be more ob· 
vious. Yet Justices Stone, Brandeis, Reed, and Black have all had occasion recently 
to dissent because the Court found an "exception" to the application of this statute. See 
Allen v. Regents, 304 U. S. 439, 453, 455 (1938) ; Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine 
Co., 284 U.S. 498,511 (1932). 
167. United States v. Cooper Corp., 61 Sup. Ct. 742, 744 (U. S. 1941). 
168. Ibid. "Primarily, our task is to read what Congress has written." F. C. C. 
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 311 U. S. 132, 135 (1940). 
169. United States v. Cooper Corp., 61 Sup. Ct. 742, 750 (U. S. 1941). 
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As in other fields of law, the temptation to personal judgment has 
been noted ;·170 and, through a series of rules, the Court has attempted 
to minimize it. A long time ago "the plain and unambiguous meaning 
of the words" was set up as a criterion.171 But the voice of the legis-
lature is addressed to all whom it may concern; a vague command is 
never "plain" and the contours of abstract terms are never obvious. 
A criterion for the criterion then became necessary, and "intent" came 
to the help of judges.172 But in tort, contract, and crime intent has proved 
illusive and often a "constructive intent," inferred from the act itself, 
had to suffice. The intent of a group of men, emerging from the intri-
cacies of a legislative process, was not less baffling. Besides, statutes 
which endure have to be applied to situations which could never have 
been in prospect. To meet such a contingency courts have employed 
the symbol "manifest intent." 173 It is, however, far from obvious what 
is manifest and what is obscure. At this point a criterion for the criterion 
for the criterion is essential. 
The need is for a quasi-ultimate in a spiraling process. The current 
bench has not been indifferent to the need of a guiding principle to 
make an evasive intent clear up the meaning of uncertain language. In a 
case in which a number of motor carriers attempted to escape the Fair 
Labor Standards Act by throwing themselves upon the mercy of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, Mr. Justice Reed wrestled valiantly 
with the problem.174 The interpretation of a statute is to find the intent 
of Congress. This "duty requires one body of public sen·ants, the judges, 
to construe the meaning of what another body, the legislators, has 
said." 175 For the "danger" that "the judges' own views" will obtrude, 
the best guard is a "lively appreciation." If the language itself will not 
do, the Court must "look beyond the words." 176 And 1\Ir. Justice 
Murphy, speaking for a bench in which the five Roosevelt appointees 
made up a majority, refused to impose <; set of blinders upon "the look 
170. "Obviously there is danger that the courts' conclusion as to lcgislath·c purpose 
\Vill be unconsciously influenced by the judges' own views •.. " United States Y. Amer-
ican Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U. S. 534, 544 (1940). Sec also the warning by ~{r. Justice 
Stone, quoted p. 1367 infra. 
171. See the cases cited by ~!r. Justice Reed in United States v. American Trucking 
Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543, n.18 (1940). See also Radin, Statutory Interpretation (1930) 
43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 867. 
172. See Jones, Statutory Doubts aud Legislative Iuteutiou (1940) 40 CoL. L. Rv.•. 
957, 965ff. 
173. See Chafee, The Disorderly Couduct of Words (1941) 41 CoL. L. REv. 331, 400. 
Sometimes, :Mr. Justice Frankfurter says, "The Congressional \',ill must be di\ined." 
Keifer & Keifer v. R F. C., 306 U. S. 381, 389 (1939). 
174. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U. S. 534 (1940). The Chief 
Justice and Justices McReynolds, Stone, and Roberts dissented. 
175. Id. at 544. 
176. Id. at 543. See note 190 infra. 
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beyond.11177 It would, where the meaning of authoritative words is at 
large, "be anomalous for us to close our minds" to anything which helps 
to make clear that which upon its face is ambiguous. It may be that 
"legislative materials" are "without probative value" or even "contra-
dictory." But "they can scarcely be deemed to be incompetent or irrclc-
vant."178 Such an attitude multiplies "the number of aids"; it makes 
canonical so large a body of material that any conscientious and reason-
able interpretation, "in accordance with preconceived notions," can be 
rested upon accepted rules of construction. 
A single case reveals the clash of canons which runs through so much 
of the Court's recent work. The issue was whether the United States, 
as a victim of collusive bidding in the purchase of automobile tires, was 
entitled to sue for triple damages under the Sherman Act. Such a 
situation was not before the Fifty-first Congress when the Sherman Act 
was passed; there is no evidence that it was in "the contemplation" of 
the members at that time. Mr. Justice Roberts, for the majority, paraded 
seven verbal reasons- in instance not in accord with historical doctrine 
and in the aggregate not wholly persuasive- for denying to the Govern-
ment the only possible relief.170 Speaking for Reed and Douglas, JJ., 
as well as for himself, Mr. Justice Black pointed out quite simply that 
the purpose of·the law was "to give purchasers of goods an opportunity 
to buy them at prices fixed by competitive trade." 180 He commented 
that it would be "strange indeed" if the Sherman Act "should now be 
found to afford a greater protection against collusive price-fixing to 
every other buyer in the United States than is afforded to the United 
States itsel£." 181 For him and his colleagues this obvious and common-
sense attitude towards the policy the statute embodies was sufficient 
without the parade of esoteric techniques for ascertaining "the intent 
of Congress"; for he added, "so much for what seems to me to be the 
logical approach to the problem, and the one that should cause us to 
say that the government can sue for damages." 182 Then, according to 
legalistic law its rhetorical due, he stated, "If, however, we apply familiar 
canons of construction, I think we are led to the same result.'' 183 
177. United States v. Dickerson, 310 U. S. 554 (1940). 
178. Id. at 562. 
179. United States v. Cooper Corp., 61 Sup. Ct. 742, 744-48 (U. S. 1941). 
· 180. Id. at 748. 
181. Id. at 749. 
182. Ibid. 
183. Ibid. If, let's say, a James 11. Beck prize should be offered for the worst dcci· 
sion of the term, the authors would like confidently to place in nomination the Cooper 
case. The runner-up would doubtless be Gray v. Powell, 61 Sup. Ct. 824 (U, S. 1941), 
which permitted a concern to escape the Bituminous Coal Act by leasing mines and 
engaging "independent contractors" to mine the coal. In the latter instance, however, 
there is a technical flaw. By an even division, the Court affirmed the judgment below; 
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As the Court becomes sparing in its use of constitutional sanctions. 
its interpretation of legislation grows in public interest. As once it fell 
into groups of "liberal" and "conservative" in respect to the supreme 
law of the land, so now lines may be forming over the pattern its 
interpretation of statutes is to take. All the justices would doubtless 
concur with Mr. Justice Frankfurter that "one certainly begins" with 
the words of the statute.184 But that is no more than to raise the ques-
tion, for the legal issue is tl1e meaning of the statute in reference to 
the matter at hand. Nor does it help to say that if words are "plain 
and unambiguous," the Court will "look no fartl1er"; for if tl1ey were, 
the Court would probably not have to look at all.185 As the issu~: is 
driven beyond words- as, because of tl1eir "trickiness," inevitably it 
must be- all will concur that the focus of deliberation is legislative 
intent. But intent lies, not in the verbal symbols, but in the purpose 
which animates them. The intent of 435 Representath·es plus 96 Senators 
becomes a matter of imputation; and, as a number of statutes play upon 
a single suit, intents may be in conflict. An appeal to the dictionaries 
is met by a demand for a "meaning" derived from "a considered weigh-
ing of every relevant aid to construction." 186 But intent, a term of art 
from private law, is too narrow a focus for all that is made to converge 
upon it. For the search is for the things that can be made to signify; 
and intent, useful enough in assessing the conduct of an individual, is 
hardly at home as a measure of a legislative act. Off its native heath, 
it is not held in restraint, and can easily sen·e sponsors whose views 
march towards opposite goals. One judge may regard a statute as a 
legislative command, to be strictly construed and se,·erely applied. 
Another, equally conscientious, may regard it as an instrument giving 
effect to a public policy. Neither. however self-effash·e, can give effect 
to a legislative purpose untainted by his own will. 
If to the judge, the letter of the law alone counts, the whole of the 
letter can be had only through inference. It is easy enough to draft 
a legal opinion which does not offend one's sense aesthetic. It is possible 
to draft several and allow the symmetry of logic to make tl1e choice. A 
strong feeling for the separation of powers may cause the jurist to 
and, conveniently enough, it did not recite its reasons. \Vhether this caEc remains as 
runner-up will depend on the action of the new Court. Rehearing has been granted. 
61 Sup. Ct. 938 (U. S. 1941). 
184. "\Vhile one may not end with the words of a disputed statute, one certainly 
begins there." F. T. C. v. Bunte Bros., 312 U. S. 349, 350 (1941). 
185. But even here, there may be an e."ception. In United States v. Dickerson, 310 
U. S. 554 (1940), there was no question of the "plain and unambiguous" meaning. Con-
gress completely forgot to say what it meant. Only by showing that the legislature 
"thought" it had said what it wanted to say could the Court a\"oid the words oi the 
statute. 
186. United States v. Dickerson, 310 U. S. 554, 562 (19-10). 
HeinOnline  -- 50 Yale L. J. 1362 1940-1941
1362 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50: 1319 
refuse to add any contribution of his own even if he is persuaded that 
the interpretation furthers the purpose the legislature had in mind. If 
the Constitution insists that wisdom is for the legislature, the Court 
should in judgment give effect to no more than the legislature did. But 
such a profession disregards the fact .that the Court deals in frozen 
words; and that courts must bring commands to life in the complex 
social situations brought before them.1~7 The lapse in language, the 
hidden inconsistency, the change in conditions, the unforeseen develop~ 
ment, the unexpected harshness, the cleverly contrived loophole- all of 
these are inevitable contingencies to be met. The judge who refuses 
to meet them neglects to keep the active statute in readiness for present 
service. Instead of keeping off the legislative beat, he helps to batter 
a static statute into uselessness. 
Unless the judge keeps dominant the purpose of the statute, the 
function of the legislature could be easily usurped. There was a time 
when Congress, in long and intricate be-it-enacted's, sought to anticipate 
every contingency which lay ahead. Now the trend is towards skeleton 
statutes flexible enough to meet any situation which lies ahead. Although 
in orbit they are large or small, in character Constitution and statute are 
much alike. Today Marshall's famous statement might be paraphrased, 
"We must never forget it is a statute we are construing.'ll88 The 
temptation to a "preconceived notion" is often insistent and never en~ 
tirely absent; many legislative acts before the Court involve policies of 
state, in accord or out of harmony with, the jurist's own social views. 
A tradition of interpretation, as reputable as its antithesis, is that pro~ 
visions are to be construed to give effect to the purpose of the legisla~ 
ture.180 A corollary is that, when words have been inaptly chosen, it 
is the duty of the Court to endow them with appropriate meaning.100 
As the phrases of command are applied to the facts, they must derive 
their meaning from a conception of the statute's office. It is the spirit 
thereof which gives life- through the minds of the justices. 
Statutory interpretation is old; but only with the retreat from the 
higher law, has it become the arena for conflict in policy. As yet the 
justices are not quite at home with its novel place in public law. In its 
usual utterance, it accords respect to the legislature, disclaims a will 
187. Compare Mr. Justice Holmes in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, 425 (1918); 
and Judge Learned Hand in Commissioner v. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co., 74 F. (2d) 
242, 247 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934). 
188. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (U. S. 1819). 
189. "It must be insisted that the legislative purposes and aims are the important 
guideposts for statutory interpretation, not the desiderata of the judge." Landis, A Note 
01~ "Statutory bfterpretation" (1930) 43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 892. 
190. "When that [plain] meaning has led to absurd or futile results, . . . this Court 
has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act." United States v. American 
Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U. S. 534, 543 (1940). 
HeinOnline  -- 50 Yale L. J. 1363 1940-1941
1941] SPECIAL COMPETENCE OF SUPREME COURT 1363 
of its own, and professes to do no more than discover what another 
body has said. Mr. Justice Frankfurter demands "the unglossed teA-t"; 
he insists, "we walk on quicksand when we try to find in the absence 
of corrective legislation a controlling legal principle"; he will have no 
commerce with "elusive and subtle casuistries. " 101 He is wary when 
"meaning is sought to be derived not from specific language but by 
fashioning a mosaic of significance out of the innuendos of disjointed 
bits of a statute." 192 He can insist that "translation of an implication 
drawn from the specific aspects of one statute to a totally different 
statute is treacherous business." 103 Yet the san1e justice can discover the 
true intent of Congress; write a marginal note into tl1e Norris-LaGuardia 
Act; use this to resolve the ambiguities of tl1e Clayton Act; and even-
tually bring the moving gloss to rest witlun the Sherman Act itsclf.1w 
For him there must be no invisible "radiation" from a judicial opinion 
into a legislative command ;10li yet, when occasion beckons, he resorts 
to interpretation by attenuation. It is unfair to say tlmt Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter alone knows the location of tl1e switch by which tl1e radia-
tion is turned off and on; for he does no more than C.'\.-pose to public 
notice the personal values which direct his e.xigetical C.'\.-ploits. Others 
are less conspicuous, not because their ways are of a different kind, but 
because they hide the sources of preference under a more mature and 
artful rhetoric.196 Men differ in vision, self-effacement, awareness; but, 
191. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 118, 121 (19~0). 
192. Palmer v. ~1assachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, S3 (1939). 
193. F. T. C. v. Bunte Bros., 312 U. S. 349, 353 (1941). 
194. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 (1941). 
:Mr. Justice Roberts, dissenting, said that the Court's interpretation seemed to him 
"a usurpation by the courts of the function of the Congress not only novel but fraught, 
as well, with the most serious dangers to our constitutional system of dhision of pow-
ers." ld. at 472. See also Gregory, Tlzc Ncr.J.• Slrcrmau-Ciaylou-.Norris-LaGuardia Act 
(1941) 8 U. OF Cm. L. RE\•. 503 ("The majority opinion displays a boldness of judicial 
technique seldom to be observed."); Landis, Tire Aprx Case (1941) 26 Cvn::. L. Q. 191, 
212D ("The technique of the majority opinion is thus difficult to defend ••• "). And 
see especially Steffen, Labor Acli<•ities i1~ Restraint of Trade: Tile Hut.:llesan Case 
(1941) 36 ILL. L. REv. 1. 
195. See F. T. C. v. Bunte Bros., 312 U. S. 349, 351 (1941). 
196. For e."\.-amples of consummate technique in concealing policies bcne:J.th artful rhet-
oric, see :Mr. Justice Stone's opinion in S. E. C. v. United States Realty & Improvement 
Co., 310 U. S. 434 (1940) ; the Chief Justice's opinion in Bacardi Corp. of America v. 
Domenech, 311 U. S. 150 (1940) ; !llr. Justice Douglas' opinion in Nye v. United States, 
61 Sup. Ct. 810 (U. S. 1941). 
Mr. Justice Black sometimes takes less pains to conceal his policy. See his opinions 
in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 (19-U); Superior Bath House Co. v. !llcCarroll, 
312 U. S. 176 (1941). But the Justice admits his disdain of the value of legal ab:J.cadabra. 
See the quotation p. 1358 supra. 
For e.'\:amples of divergent views, each persuasive in its arguments for the correct 
statutory construction of the Elkins Act, sec the majority and minority or•inions in L"nion 
P. R. R. v. United States, 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4371 (U. S. 19~1). 
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in so intricate a matter as giving effect to the will of the legislature, 
the jurist without a philosophy of law- and of life- is lost. 
Implicit in all such utterance is the ·conc<;!pt of competence. It may 
well be, when the Court has become habituated to the statutory front 
as its main line of operation, that it will chisel out an orderly pattern 
of competence. Here, as in constitutional matters, reliance must be 
placed upon the Court's own approach. Its task is easiest when an 
administrative agency mediates between verbal command and its appliM 
cation. Then a presumption is set down in favor of the meaning im-
posed upon the disputed words by the body charged with direct respon-
sibility.197 A long-standing administrative ruling is entitled to great 
weight ;198 re-enactment in the face of outstanding interpretation is in-
dicative of Congressional acquiescence.199 An extension of such rules is 
implicit in recent utterance and seems inevitable.200 An agency of governM 
ment is an institution; the statute which called it into being is an enM 
abling act; its policy is not a legislative manifest, but an aggregate 
of usages sprung from the law-in-action. The claims for the expert, 
the intangibles of the situation, the effective performance of its function 
are as pertinent as with constitutional issues. It may be that clashing 
policies need to be brought into accord; but, within their respective 
domains, the Court may well recognize an authority more competent 
than itself. 
In bald terms, such a respect for "the executive" would once have 
been called improper delegation of judicial power. It amounts rather 
to a broad qualification set against the doctrine of separation. It can 
be as glibly argued as ever it was that an agency cannot enlarge its 
own authority by a "strained" interpretation; that appeal to Congress 
for amendment is the only lawful means of correction. But this theoreti-
cal distinction overlooks the very character of the current process of 
regulation. In the conduct of affairs a stream of questions emerges; 
the answer to each must be inserted in its place as events move hurriedly 
on. The judgment must be made at once, by the agency which promises 
to make it best, out of the fullest factual and the best legal materials 
which are at hand. Legislative and executive are only aspects of the 
same process, differing somewhat in scope and character, but not to be 
197. See United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U. S. 534, 549 (1940) ; 
Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 315 (1933). 
198. See Paul, Use and Abuse of Tax Regulations i11 Statlltory Constructio1~ (1940) 
49 YALE L. J. 660, 662, nn. 12, 13; Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem 
(1941) 54 HARV. L. REV. 398, 408ff. 
199. See Paul, supra note 198, at 663ff; Griswold, srlpra note 198, at 399fT. 
200. The indicated extension is not on a conceptual level alone. Indications arc that 
the Court may very well use the rules only when their incidence is a realistic aid to 
support of e."-:ecutive action. See Helvering v. Reynolds, 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4332, 4333 (U. 
S. 1941); Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U. S. 90, lOOff. (1939). 
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severely distinguished. An e.xecutive formulating controls for legislative 
action does not stand over the frontier from the e.xecutive formulating 
policies of enforcement under the statute.201 A Court, mindful of its 
own place within modem government, will be slow to question the 
interpretation of agencies to which such matters come in regular course. 
The logic, which accords "independence" to the legislature, seems to 
support a kindred "administrative finality." 
It will be objected that such a surrender by the Court invites "govern-
ment by bureaucracy." The fault with such an argument is that it shifts 
its issue in its course. It assumes that the executive is prone to, and 
the judiciary immune from, a reading of its own preferences into the 
administration of the law. It assumes a liberty in one group of human 
beings which it replaces with a restraint in the other. Even more, it 
endows with irresponsibility the more responsible body, and confers a 
divine aloofness upon the one held to no accounting. A more practical 
objection is that an overweening e.xecutive could make the scope o.f his 
authority limitless ;202 but tl1is applies, with even greater force, to the 
Court. The objection overlooks, in the one case as in the other, the 
traditions of a going institution which play upon a personnel which 
comes and goes. In respect to the administering agency, it disregards 
the confinements of language. Legislation is to be looked at, not as a 
code of rules for unchanging conduct, but as a grant of power to public 
officials, within a certain domain and subject to specified limitations, 
to direct private activities toward the public utility. Just as the will of 
the Court is restrained by the necessity of producing a satisfying reason, 
so the executive is held in check by the demand to justify the e.xercise 
of power.203 If the executive act escapes tl1e sanctions upon which it 
usually rests for support, the Court can be asked for an ultra vires. 
Nor is the judiciary the sole reliance against an agency off its beat; a 
"hands-off" by the Court would tl1row to the legislature the main burden 
of limiting executive action. In verbal terms legislation may be con-
fining or eA'"Pansive; and its permissive range can, in tl1eir several degrees, 
be eA'"Panded or contracted by the legislature, by the agency, by the 
court. The real question is who is to decide where discretion is to be 
lodged. In the long-run the active down-to-earth administrator will be 
201. Compare "Furthermore, the Commission's interpretation gains much persuasive-
ness from the fact that it was the Commission which suggested the provision's ennctment 
to Congress." United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U. S. 534, 549 (1940). 
202. Compare the case of the Webb-Kenyon Act, vetoed by President Taft prindp:llly 
on grounds of its unconstitutionality, passed OYer his Yeto, and then upheld by the Court 
in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western :M. Ry., 242 U. S. 311 (1917). See Bikle, The Silcr.cc 
of Congress (1927) 41 HARv. L. REv. 200, 210-11. 
203. It might be argued, of course, that almost anything can be justified, given a suf-
ficiently nimble wit; the objection applies with like force to the Court. 
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better able to shape a statute into a going control than will a court 
operating in its rarified climate. 204 
It goes without saying that the Court cannot formally accept the usage 
of executive interpretation. As with the constitutional issue, its selfM 
denial will find dominant expression in the language of presumption. 
But, the individual votes of the justices may underline the current trend 
and make it increasingly evident that such a motivating factor operates 
silently.205 In fact, as an inarticulate major premise, such an indulgence 
to the executive may have more validity as a device of prediction than 
criteria to which verbal homage is constantly paid. If the accommodaM 
tion of legislative policy to statute-in-action is shifted from Court to 
executive, the bounds of the citizen's permissiole activity will be found, 
not in the occasional grand pronouncements from the heights, but in 
the every-day close-to-facts rulings of administrators. The United States 
Reports will then, even less than before, contain "the law"; the less 
pretentious but more realistic records of active agencies of control will 
state the substance. 
Here, then, in the struggle for judicial supremacy is the new battle-
front. Neither executive nor legislature can adequately discharge its 
office without a sympathetic judiciary. The current bench does not 
question the power to govern; it is just now inventing and perfecting 
techniques for use in statutory interpretation. Its commitments in spe-
cific cases and with particular doctrines bear the experimental quality 
of a formative period. For that reason, even where utterances ring out 
with dogma, they are to be accepted as somewhat less than authoritative. 
As CA-perience accumulates, a technology in the making will develop, 
and pieces - many of them to be newly cut - will come into place. 
In the transition, the molar gives way to the molecular, and the change 
of scale makes it possible to revise without beating a retreat. The more 
minute workmanship creates less exposure to attack. But, if it further 
withdraws the judicial process from public scrutiny, it also robs the 
process of a kind of other-world finality. A statute sacrificed to the 
204. In this connection it is important to observe that the administrator can always 
shape policy by refusing to act. This may be as far-reaching in its impact as vigorous 
enforcement would be. Judicial restriction is on action alone; as a safeguard against 
e:'Cecutive action, it may cause more injustice through interfering only half-way than would 
be caused by an unhampered administrator working out a consistent over-aU program. 
See generally Arnold, Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social DisscctJ'on (1932) 42 
YALE L. J. 1. 
205. Reading Mr. Justice Reed's opinion in the America1t Trucking case [note 174 
supra] and compiling his votes in the Btmte, Cooper, Union Pacific, and Classic cases 
[notes 184, 179, 196 supra and 239 infra], one might assume that his experience as a 
Solicitor General has led him to formulate some such philosophy of acknowledging 
executive interpretation. Except for their dissents in the Union Pacific and Classic cases, 
the same might be said of Justices Black and Douglas. 
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supreme law of the land was null and void; an ultra vires set against 
statute may be erased by the legislature. The move has been into a 
universe of relative values- and away from the absolute. 
VII. UMPIRE TO THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
Another novel battleground in the struggle for judicial supremacy 
accompanies the retreat from the Constitution. If the bench displays 
a tolerance of the laws of the states, it has not closed its door to cases 
concerned with them. Its acceptance of federal supremacy is unquali-
fied;206 and, if it allows statutes to stand, it is because they carry no 
hazard to the operation of tl1e national Government. It will, in the 
modesty of its office, attempt to construe in such a way as to bring the 
national and the local measure into accord.207 But, if the conflict cannot 
be avoided, the Act of Congress is tl1e supreme law, and the command 
of the state must yield.208 Only infrequently will a dormant federal 
power, such as the commerce clause, be employed to nullify legislation.203 
Hence, if a state act is struck down, it is usua11y because Congress has 
invaded the domain. If a11owed to stand, it is not because the state 
act is in itself irrevocably valid, but because Congress has said nothing 
to the contrary. If, later, Congress should speak where now it is silent, 
the Court would enter the federal priority against the once-valid act. 
The criteria are for the Court itself to employ; and justices, persuaded 
that displays of local regulation are obnoxious, may easily assert that 
through its act the Congress has taken over tl1e domain. A caveat has 
recently come from Mr. Justice Stone: "At a time when the e.xercise 
of the federal power is being rapidly C.'-"Panded through Congressional 
action, it is difficult to overstate the importance of safeguarding" local 
authority against "vague inferences as to what Congress might have 
intended if it had considered the matter" or "by reference to our own 
conceptions of a policy which Congress has not C.'-"Pressed and which 
is not plainly to be inferred from the legislation whicl1 it has enacted.":uo 
The power to annul is still there; the Court has not turned its back upon 
a federal supervision of the state legislature; it has merely substituted 
Congressional veto for constitutional prohibition. 
206. Even cases denying e.'>:ercise of Congressional power cont:lin hints that the Court 
would not oppose the e.'>:ercise, were Congress to amend its words. See F. T. C. v. Bunte 
Bros., 312 U. S. 349, 355 (1941). 
207. See :Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598 (1940) ; Board of County Comm'rs v. 
United States, 308 U. S. 343 (1939). 
208. Hines v. Davido\vitz, 312 U. S. 52 (1941); Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domen-
ech, 311 U. S. 150 (1940) ; McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U. S. 414 (1940) ; •f. 
California v. Thompson, 61 Sup. Ct. 930 (U. S. 1941). 
209. See note 93 sllpra. 
210. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 75 (1941). 
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As with endowing statutes with meaning, the real question is the 
nature and extent of the Court's intrusion into the field of policy. If it 
acts only where the state barges into a domain where federal control 
is established, there is nothing to note. 211 Nor will there be serious 
difficulty if the regulation by the state is of a kind with and less severe 
than that of the Federal Government.212 The bother arises when states 
attempt to impose different and more stringent measures than has seemed 
to Congress wise.213 The Court's sanction is that Congress has pre-
empted the field; and that almost necessarily involves judgment by 
implication, for rarely will the national act specifically deny to the state 
all concurrent power. As between a proper exercise of police power and 
a direct thrust into an alien domain, only inference can separate "essence" 
from "incident." A Congressional Act, which literally comes into no 
collision, can be endowed with a purpose at odds with the state's ob-
jective. In a recent case, context and background of a federal statute 
were drawn upon to prove that Congress wished oil for ship's stores 
to be free from state, as well as national, taxation.214 By its invocation 
of legislative history this technique is less subject to abuse than is a 
direct resort to inference. An inferred dichotomy between "practices 
in commerce" and "transactions affecting commerce" 21c; -like all dis-
tinctions which lack a tangible reference- supplies the judge's pleasure 
with a comfortable sanction. 
The language of statutes, legislative history, judicial tradition may 
draw their lines and impose their pressures; yet there remains an area 
in which notions of policy and even personal prejudice can have a role 
in the play. As with the meaning of statutes, the Court may discover 
a substitute whose proper duty it is to pass upon all questions of policy. 
A few years ago, a number of states, as amici cttriae, refused to protest 
a federal control of the bituminous coal industry; they uniformly in-
sisted that regulation, not only of prices, but of wages and hours as well, 
lay beyond the "competence" of the separate commonwealths ;210 the 
current bench would undoubtedly attach great weight to such testimony. 
211. See Railroad Comm. of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 257 U. S. 563 
(1922); Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U. S. 47 (1929) (treaty); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U. S. 
332 (1924) (treaty). 
212. See Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S. 1, 10-14 (1937); cf. Consolidated Edison 
Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S. 197, 222-24 (1938). 
213. See Erie R. R. v. New York, 233 U. S. 671 (1914); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 
228 u. s. 115 (1913). 
214. McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U. S. 414 (1940); cf. West India Oil Co. v. 
Domenech, 311 U. S. 20 (1940). 
215. See F. T. C. v. Bunte Bros., 312 U. S. 349 (1941). For a discussion o£ this 
dichotomy as related to expansion of federal power over a period of years see (1941) 50 
YALE L. J. 1294. 
216. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936). 
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If the question is whether state legislation encroaches upon federal 
policy, no more persuasive argument could be presented, than a brief 
by the United States disclaiming sucl1 trespass. o An insistence by the 
United States that such a conflict does e..xist should possess equal pro-
bative value.217 Such a procedure amounts to receiving the observations 
of persons who occupy vantage posts; it is a preventive against the 
casual assertion of authority by the judiciary. Although sucl1 devices 
are still inchoate, there is no longer a disposition to exalt a theoretical 
federalism over a practical government.218 
The paths of retreat from policy-making are not yet beaten. Nor do 
they all move in a single direction. Now and then a trail, by a circuitous 
route, leads back to the political front. It may prove to be the rule-
as it is already evident in the instance- that the liberty accorded e..xecu-
tive and legislature is postulated upon an expectation of good behavior. 
In England the courts assume that the Houses of Parliament "intend'' 
to obsen•e the proprieties which the courts belie,·e are inseparable from 
good government.219 In emulation, the Court may in effect be saying, 
"\Ve grant you power, 0 Congress, but we will presume that you do 
not intend to overstep limits which to us seem fit and proper." A literal 
"null and void" is bad; an "ultra vires" at just the right time may 
prove an effective warning. A strong government has come to be 
essential; it cannot retain its efficiency in the face of a reiterated series 
of vetoes. If the Court is to retain its oversight, its obtrusions must 
be less frequent and less obvious than in days of yore. Its subtle pres-
sures must be attended by a great deference to the legislature in fornm-
lating policies and to the e..xecutive in their administration. 
VIII. THE FACTS OF THE CASE 
A court of law has ways of impressing its will upon the course of 
events. It may invoke the Constitution, find a meaning within the lines 
of a statute, direct the moves which make up due process to a result 
of its own. In motion, party, jurisdiction, certiorari it has a vast area 
217. See Hale v. Bimco Trading Co., 306 U. S. 375, 379 (1939) where the Court 
took cognizance of the brief filed by the Government. The Government also opposed the 
state statute invalidated in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 (1941). Note the problem 
in Mitchell v. United States, 61 Sup. Ct. 873 (U. S. 1941), where the Solicitor General 
filed a brief in opposition to the position taken by the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
And see :Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598 (1940), where the combined efforts of the 
Solicitor General and the Commission were unavailing. 
218. There are apparent e."ceptions to this. See F. T. C. v. Bunte Bros., 312 U. S. 
349 (1941); (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1294; Union P. R. R. v. United States, 9 U. S. I-
WEEK 4371, 4379 (U. S. 1941) (dissent). 
219. See Cole, "Gcn:ermncnt," ''Law," aud tlzc Scparatiau of Pcn.:~rs {19391 33 A~·l. 
PoL. Scr. REv. 424, 42&-33. 
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in which to operate; here the individual ruling has little significance apart 
from the general pattern which all such holdings make. Typical of the 
lesser devices of judi~ial discretion is "the facts." As with Constitu-
tion or statute the Court chisels a major premise to its liking, so here 
it brings its craft to bear upon the minor premise. Here, in comparison 
with the lower courts, it has scant opportunity and must work within 
narrow quarters. Yet, by its own example as well as by words of ad-
monition, its authority runs out through the whole judicial system. 
In a sense the impact of fact-finding on public policy is indirect. A 
judge may be biased or judicial; he may be sensitive or insensitive, 
realistic or ritualistic, in his search for the total situation. The Court 
may insist upon a clean-cut separation between "the recitation of facts" 
and "the conclusions in law"; and Mr. Justice Douglas may, in an 
elaborate opinion, which is virtually a Papal Bull to the bishops of the 
judicial dioceses, give a superb demonstration of how it is done.220 Yet 
men are well-set in habit before they come to the bench, and the most 
that can be done is to enhance critical awareness and to induce a high 
resolve towards better workmanship. Nor is litigation an ideal instru-
ment for capturing a protracted course of corporate events or throwing 
into focus and relief the larger situation which is the reality of the instant 
case. It was in a concern with elementary problems of tort, crime, con~ 
tract, that the technology of trial was developed, and it has never been 
adequately accommodated to a recognition of the values of public policy. 
A long time ago the executive and the legislature recognized the need 
for the expert and a mitigation of the severities of process. The judi-
ciary not only lagged far behind; but only a few years ago were con-
demning other agencies of government for attempting to streamline 
procedure. Departures from the great ceremonial were denounced as 
denials of the rudiments of fair play and proceedings akin to Star 
Chamber.221 At least within the narrow orbit of review, this hostility 
has been abated by the Supreme Court. 222 As Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
remarked for the current bench, "Modern administrative tribunals are 
the outgrowth of conditions far different" from those which brought 
traditional procedure into being. They have, to a large degree, "been a 
response to the felt need of governmental supervision over economic 
enterprise- a supervision which could effectively be exercised neither 
directly through self-executing legislation nor by the judicial process." 
He cautions that unless the "vital differentiations between the functions 
of judicial and administrative tribunals are observed, courts will stray 
220. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Co~, 310 U. S. 150 (1940). 
Recognition should also be accorded Justices Brandeis and Stone for their crusades 
over the years in behalf of the minor premise. See notes 83, 85 supra. 
221. Jones v. S. E. C., 298 U. S. 1, 33 (1936), quoted in note 157 supra. 
222. See note 51 snpra. 
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outside their province and read the laws of Congress through the dis-
torting lenses of inapplicable legal doctrine." 223 
Such an approach frees the agency of administration from irrelevant 
tradition. Inability of the judicial system to accommodate itself to these 
demands might nullify a public policy. The inadequacy of trial-at-law 
as a method of capturing the pattern of trade practice to determine 
whether an industry has violated the anti-trust laws is notorious;~' yet 
it is but a sterling e..xample of the frustration with which in the court-
room the law confronts the affairs of big business. If techniques arc 
evolved which enable regulation to keep in step with business, the best 
exhortation to the lower courts is not to interfere. Administration must 
contrive its own technology, and a distinctive accomplishment of the 
present bench is to impose a laissez-faire upon parties who would oppose. 
It is, however, not enough to refuse to e.."':alt the judicial process and 
to admit that there are other ways to so much of truth as is to be had. 
A court review of the facts would distort administration, by causing 
the focus to shift from the situation below to the supen·ision imposed 
from above. Any competence which persons skilled in the matters at 
hand possess goes for naught if courts reweigh evidence. Here the 
present justices recognize nearness, e..'\."Perience, intangibles, the feel for 
the situations, factors in the equation of decision which cannot be con-
stricted into a formula of requisites.22::; They are keenly aware that the 
relevant facts transcend the written evidence and that, should they under-
take to review, a host of pertinent considerations lie beyond their reach. 
At best they can justify a substitution of their own judgment only by 
"a lack of substantial evidence" ; but so normless a criterion easily drifts 
into we-do-not-approve-of-the-result. Severity at the top if not suffi-
ciently articulate may easily lead to laxity in its use further down ;~a 
and a number of recent lectures to lower courts indicates the omni-
presence of temptation.22i The uncompromising self-denial as now devel-
oping is essential to the integrity of fact-finding. But here, as with 
Constitution and statute, a disclaimer of discretion is not an abdication 
of power. In the midst of relatives, there can be no absolute for self-
223. F. C. C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 142, 144 (19·10). 
224. See H~LTON A:t-.'1> TILL, ANTITRUST IN AcrtoN (TNEC ~lonogr3ph Xo. 16, 
1940) 45-75, 101-20. 
225. "This is a task of striking a balance and reaching a judgment on factors beset 
with doubts and difficulties, uncertainty and speculation." United States ,.. Morgan, 9 
U. S. L. WEEK 4336, 4337 (U. S. 1941). See also the quotation in note 77 supra. 
226. It may be that a feeling of uneasiness over how carefully lower courts would 
heed the e.'\.-plicit qualifications set forth by the Court to confine its ruling within narrow 
limits, led to the dissents in N. L. R. B. v. Express Publishing Co., 61 Sup. Ct. 693 (U. 
S. 1941) and l!ilk Wagon Drivers Union'"· lieadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 2¢~ (1941). 
227. See the Court's statement of reasons for gr3nting certiorari in N. L. R. B. v. 
Waterman S. S. Co., 309 U. S. 206, 208-09 (19-10). 
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denial. The "rudimentary requirements of fair play" must still be 
insured ;228 there must always be more than "a mere scintilla" of evi~ 
dence.229 Here, as elsewhere, the only guarantee of the Court staying 
within the limits of its competence is the discipline which it imposes 
upon its own conduct. 
In the area in which the finding of facts belongs to the courts, the 
question is different. So long as the resort is to the law, the Court is 
overseer to the system and no aspect of litigation lies without its com~ 
petence. Its task is to use its power, without reserve, to make the 
process of judicial fact-finding as efficient as possible.230 It must, for 
the same reason, employ its authority to preserve the procedures which 
safeguard the liberties of the individual. "Under our constitutional 
system, courts stand against any winds that blow as havens of refuge 
for those who might otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, 
outnumbered, or because they are non-conforming victims of prejudice 
and public excitement." 231 The Court may refuse to strike down legis~ 
lation which seems to it inimical to the common good; it may indulge: 
a statute far beyond the limits which seem to it wise. But it will make 
a sharp distinction between actions initiated in an administrative body 
and in a court; surrender facts to an agency more competent to find 
them; and demand that judges below be fully informed about the situa~ 
tions to which they apply the law. In its insistence upon the facts in 
the instant case the Court is well within its traditional duty; as respects 
another arm of the government, the "findings," as the facts of the 
action before it, should be fully set forth.232 Whether the administrative 
or the judicial process shall be used is for the legislature; but, where the 
issue is left to justiciable settlement, the Court stands supreme within 
its bailiwick. 
The ancient writ of habeas corpus may well usurp the final word. 
From a time when the purposive memory of man runneth not to the 
contrary, it has belonged to the courts; and surely competence dwells 
where authority is established. So long as it is not used as an entering 
228. Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1938). The latest case in this 
eleven-year litigation, though finally upholding the Secretary of Agriculture, docs not 
purport to overrule the quoted proposition. United States v. Morgan, 9 U. S. L. WL'EK 
4336 (U. S. 1941). 
229. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S. 197, 229 (1939). But 
when the Court begins to admit "imponderables," it becomes difficult to be sure what is 
a "mere scintilla." See notes 77, 225 supra. 
230. See Hughes, Foreword (1941) 50 YALE L. ]. 737, 738. 
231. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 241 (1940). 
232. See United States v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 293 U. S. 454 (1935) ; Panama Ref. 
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935); cf. Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 
u. s. 176 (1935). 
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wedge for policy, it is an appropriate judicial tool.~ Congress may 
decide that, under e:~traordinary circumstances, particular liberties may 
be abridged, and the Court may be loath to issue any order to the con-
trary. But it need not hesitate to inquire into whether the circumstances 
of the instance fall within the limits of the proscription. It is beyond 
question that in time of crisis, public officials are over-zealous, and the 
facts as found may depart from the truth. Or the courts themselves, 
under the spirit of a holy crusade, may allow fictions to corrode their 
minor premises. But, when feelings run high and reason has become 
captive to the emotions, any power is likely to be abused. The real 
question is the relevant competence of the courts to separate the seditious 
element from the lawful e.'--pression of personal freedom. Their record, 
as the last great war attests, is far from spotless. 23" But it is hard to 
think of an agency of control which would not have done far more. 
And where courts are competent- if only because of the meager hope 
of lodging authority elsewhere- it is well to leave them free to handle 
a difficult matter in their own way. 23 [1 
IX. THE POWER OVER POWERS 
It is hazardous to attempt to discover a pattern still in the maldng 
in the detail of separate judgment. Except for a general word here and 
there, the Court has not published the design which it is imposing upon 
the activities of government; and those who seek to make e."'plicit where 
all is still implicit act at their peril. Yet a recitation of holdings re,·ersed, 
of advanced points taken, of doctrines turned back upon themselves or 
given a new direction somehow falls short of what the Court has been 
doing. The manner of work, the range of jurisdiction, the things left 
undone, the changes effected beyond the orbit of litigation, the hundred 
intangibles which attend an agency of control all testify to a political 
revolution. Not only are the ways of the Court changed and the office 
of the judiciary redefined; but also lines between the great provinces 
of government are being redrawn and a revised modus Of't'rtmdi is 
being imposed upon each. 
As yet the movement is too fast to allow an abiding perspective. In 
each of the last three "October terms" a different picture has been 
presented. In the first the coming of new men was most apparent and 
233. For evidence of the seriousness which the Court attaches to the writ of hab~s 
corpus, see Holiday v. Johnston, 9 U. S. L. WEER 4343 (U. S. 1941); Er Parle Hull, 61 
Sup. Ct. 640 (U. S. 1941) ; Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U. S. 329 (1941) ; Walker v. John-
ston, 312 U. S. Z!S (1941); Johnson Y. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938). 
234. See CHAFE£, FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920). 
235. This discussion of the writ of habeas corpus applies with only somewhat less 
certainty to the other e.'\:traordinary writs utilized by courts. 
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views stood out with individual sharpness. In the second, there was 
a tendency for newcomers to get together and in the face of their older 
colleagues to declare the law. In the third, with the disappearance of 
"the last of the Romans," there has been drift towards a new alignment. 
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, now as always, is far more concerned with 
the vitality of the institution over which he presides than with doctrinal 
integrity among its members.236 Mr. Justice Stone, naturally enough, 
seems content enough with advance positions to which for years he 
never dreamed that he could bring his Court. Mr. Justice Roberts 
finds the majority of the bench far away from the center from which 
he used to shuttle to right or left. The disappearance of the Four Horse~ 
men has made a far greater difference than the departure of Brandeis 
and Cardozo, JJ. For a bench of nine, confronted by the problems 
of a culture in crisis is bound to divide; and, since the stalwarts are 
no longer there to put their questions, the division will be along new 
lines. Already there is evidence of an authoritarian group,231 to be led 
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, and of a realistic group, with Mr. Justice 
Black and Mr. Justice Douglas in the van. But the area of difference 
will be more confined, and the lines of severance more loosely drawn 
than in the past. 
But, as justices differ when novel questions come, an area onc·e in 
dispute promises to become a domain of order. It will be taken for 
granted that "a court travels beyond its province" when it usurps the 
office of another body. A doctrine of competence will accord rightful 
domains to various agencies of government; and, within appropriate 
limits, each will have a liberty to shape its procedure to its task and a 
finality of discretion quite absent in the old days. A judicial retreat 
means an advance by the executive or the legislature; a surrender of 
authority by the Court means its assumption somewhere else. The 
current bench clings as closely as any bench of old to the separation 
of powers. In using competence to deny its own power, it employs its 
own authority to mark out zones of competence. The separation of 
powers is as the Court's own power makes it. 
But a caveat is in order. Separation of powers, doctrines of compe~ 
tence, redefinitions of domains of authority- these are abstractions used 
to describe institutions which move forward only by man~power. And 
men have convictions- convictions of the "Good Society," of means 
236. Almost at press time news comes of the departure of the Chief Justice. The 
succession of Stone parades more than insures the continuity with the past. I£ the 
appointment of Byrnes obtrudes an unknown factor, that of Jackson should make of 
the new Court an even newer Court. His insistence that institutional, as well as 
personnel, change is essential, may be expected to give drive to trends already in 
evidence. See his THE STRUGGLE FOR JuDICIAL SuPREMAcY (1941) c. X. 
237. A result of the "austerity" approach. See note 142 supra. 
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of achieving it, of each one's proper duty in aiding the achievement. 
Which of these convictions motivates a judge is never ob,·ious. Some-
times his vote coincides with them all; sometimes there is conflict. Given 
conflict, one of them must overpower the others.238 The infallible, the 
ideal judge is conceived in terms of proper duty in furthering the 
achievement of the Good Society. But man is fallible; he cannot always 
put aside his deeper conviction of the substance of the Good Society. 
Hence any delineation of power in the abstract must leave wide margins 
for the dereliction occasioned by that "higher" duty. 
It is well, therefore, to be wary of the Court bearing gifts. An ancient 
line can be made to read, "the power to give involves the power to take 
back." The Court's surrender is not as plenary as it is represented. 
But as it retreats from the Constitution to statutes, it can do with an 
ultra vires almost all that a null-and-void can accomplish.233 It meets 
conflicting meanings, where policy alone can make the choice, and policy 
is what the Court says it is. In the lesser orbit, where the matter is 
less exposed to public discussion, the e.xercise of discretion may be more 
smug and less forthright than in the e.'-position of the higher law. But, 
however tolerant it may be, the "independence" of other agencies is but 
another name for the Court's indulgence. The Court escaped reform 
from without by reforming itself from- within. But the duration of that 
reform is at the Court's pleasure. Even in creating a government of 
laws, the Court cannot escape being a government of men. In last 
analysis, agencies of state are but instruments ; it is the people who must 
preserve the ancient liberties. 
238. Assuming that these three categories e.waust the field. Such convictions as that 
one's friends should always win, or that justice should be dispensed by coin-flipping are too 
fantastic to consider. And even if accepted, they could be subsumed under one of the 
headings above. 
239. It should be remembered that Congress may never get around to changing a 
statute once it has been construed. This is particularly true of a burning issue. The 
Louisiana primary case turned, so far as a split of the justices was concerned, on statu-
tory interpretation. But the question might just as well have been a constitutional one, 
for it seems unlikely that Congress would have acted no matter which way the decision 
went. See United States v. Classic, 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4355 (U. S. 1941). 
